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RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND THE LAW
Paul G. Kauper* and Stephen C. Ellis**

I.

INTRODUCTION

decisive event in the history of Christianity was the edict of
Constantine, which recognized the validity of bequests to the
Catholic Church, thereby enabling the Church in its corporate capacity to receive, hold, and accumulate property1 and laying the foundation for the erection of a legal structure that was to have profound
implications for both the church and the state. It is not the purpose
of this article to develop at length the history of the church's ownership of land and the reaction against it during the Reformation that
often resulted in confiscation of church lands and enactment of mortmain laws limiting the amount of land that churches could hold.
The point is simply that the granting of a legal right to churches to
acquire, hold, and accumulate property is of prime significance with
respect to the place of the church in a secular society.2
Unincorporated associations such as churches face problems of
title with respect to the acquisition, use, and disposition of property,
particularly real estate.3 At the early common law, a deed of land to
an unincorporated association was ineffective.4 If the deed were con-

A

• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Earlham
College; J.D. 1932, University of Michigan.-Ed.
•• Member of the Washington Bar. B.A. 1967, University of Washington; J.D. 1970,
University of Michigan.-Ed.
I. The edict reads as follows:
The same Augustus to the people.
Each and every one should have, when departing, the freedom to leave what
property he has wished to the most holy and venerable council of the Catholic
Church.
Decisions should not be void.
There is nothing which is more due to persons than that the writing of their
last will, after which they no longer can will anything, should be unrestricted
and that their decisions, because it does not return again, should be free.
Posted on 3 July at Rome, Crispus and Constantine Caesars being consuls
for the second time.
P. COLEMAN·NORTON, ROMAN STATE AND CHRISI'IAN CHURCH 85-86 (1966).
2. "Corporate organization represents one of the supreme achievements of highly
civilized society. The substantial benefits to be derived from such a legal mechanism
have been recognized by Church and State, which in turn have adapted the corporate
scheme to their respective needs. The relation between Church and State may be
gleaned by an analysis of the position which the State assumes toward the eccelesiastical juristic personality." B. BROWN, THE CANONICAL Jt1RIS11C PERSONALITY WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO !TS STA11IS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (1927).
3. For general law and history of unincorporated associations and their legal
capacity, see H. FORD, UNINCORPORATED NON-PROFIT AssoCIATIONS (1959); s. WRIGHTINGTON, THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BUSINESS TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923);
Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARv. L. REv. 404 (1916).
4. See IR. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 510-17 (1969); Ford, Dispositions of Property to
Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations, 55 MICH. L. REv. 67, 71-76 (1956).
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sidered to be a deed to the individual members of the association as
tenants in common, the transfer was effective, but the further disposition of the property and the devolution of individual members' interests created difficulties. Was each member's share his own property
interest and thus part of his disposable estate, or was it impressed
with some kind of trust for the benefit of the church?
The same questions could be raised if land intended for the benefit of the church were transferred by deed to an officer of a hierarchical church (such as a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church). Did
the land pass to the bishop in his personal capacity and become subject, therefore, to disposition by him during his lifetime or at death,
or was there an implicit limitation that the property was to be held
by him and his successors in office solely for the benefit of the
church?
Two legal devices, the trust and the corporation, could be used
to deal with the problem of title. A deed to a church officer could be
regarded as a transfer in trust, thereby ensuring that the property
would be used in perpetuity for the benefit of the church, with the
occupant of the office at any given time serving as the trustee. Or the
bishop could be regarded as a corporation holding the property for
the purposes of the church, and each successor bishop would exercise
the corporation's authority over the property. In either case, perpetual ownership of the property for the purpose of the church was
assured.
An unincorporated association, with its many members, would
raise more difficulties in working out the trust idea, unless it could
be said that the deed to the association was a transfer in trust for the
benefit of the church generally, that the land would be held in trust
for such a purpose, and that the officers of the church could serve as
trustees for the further disposition of the property. Clearly, the trust
approach became easier if the property were transferred to named
persons as trustees to hold for the benefit of the church. Apart from
the trust pattern, the association could assert control over the property only if the church or one of its officers had been accorded a corporate status by the state. It is conceivable, of course, that a statute
could grant a limited corporate status to a church solely for the purpose of holding and disposing of property without giving it all the
aspects of a legally incorporated body.
It is clear from any preliminary discussion of this problem that
a close and interesting relation exists between the trust and the
corporate concepts as they are used to allow nonprofit associations
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to acquire and hold property. Indeed, the end results of the trust
device and the incorporation device are virtually the same. This is
particularly true when, under a statute that provides for incorporation of a church body, the trustees are both the incorporators and the
corporate body, so that the control and disposition of the property
is in the hands of the trustees in their corporate capacity and, in tum,
any disposition must be made by them. At this point the difference
between an explicit conveyance in trust for the benefit of a given
group and the incorporation of trustees to achieve the same purpose
is even less pronounced.
The availability of the trust device in itself presents an important
question. Although originally equity would not enforce a trust without specifically identified beneficiaries, this doctrine was eventually
modified by the development of the charitable trust concept, by
means of which property could be given to a trustee for a particular
use or for the benefit of a group that was not specifically determined,
provided the purpose of the trust was educational, charitable, or religious. The extension of the charitable trust doctrine to include
trusts set up for religious purposes was a development of prime importance to the churches. Originating in England, the charitable
trust doctrine was generally adopted by American courts.6
Many of the observations concerning the status of religious societies are equally applicable to other nonprofit associations that are
organized for purposes within the charitable trust idea or that come
within the range of incorporation statutes. It is only because the
granting of special legal privileges may be deemed to raise a peculiar
type of constitutional question in terms of church-state relations that
the problems of religious associations deserve special attention. This
article will attempt to present a picture of the legal status of religious
organizations, with particular reference to the enjoyment of the corporate privilege. Necessarily, this will involve at the outset an historical review tracing the development of that status, beginning with
the practice of granting special charters to churches and culminating
in the now familiar general incorporation statute. Special attention
will be paid to distinctive problems that arose in Utah, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia concerning corporate status. The historical review is
followed by a summary survey of the current state laws relating to
the incorporation of churches. The last section deals with questions
that the granting and conditioning of corporate status for churches
and the applicability of corporation laws to church bodies may raise
under the religion clauses of the first amendment.
5. See, e.g., Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
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HISTORY OF CHURCH CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The history of ecclesiastical corporations in the United States is
a relatively unknown and unexplored area of law. The text materials
available for study are sparse and, for the most part, of considerable
vintage. 6 Therefore, in any attempt to portray this history reliance
must be placed primarily on case law, and, to a lesser degree, on the
statutes and enactments of the era under review.
A.

Roman and English Antecedents

The Roman law first conceived of the notion of a body of people
with a collective interest acting together as a legally recognized unit
to govern its own affairs. Such groups were called collegia or universitates and were given certain collective powers, such as the power
to hold land.7 While the edict of Constantine8 did not speak directly
to the incorporation of individual churches, it implied a corporate
capacity for local congregations by allowing them to accept legacies
as a unit. The early Roman Catholic Church recognized the usefulness of corporate status and soon adopted the idea into the canon
Iaw.9 Organizations with the power to hold land could be created
simply by the formation of a voluntary association by parties with
6. C. BARTLE'IT, THE TENURE OF PAROCHIAL PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
.AMERICA (1926): B. BROWN, THE CANONICAL JURimc PERSONAIJTY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1927): H. DESMOND, THE CHURCH
AND THE LAW (1898); P. DIGNAN, A HISTORY OF THE LEGAL INCORPORATION OF CATIIOLIC
CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1784-1932) (1935); W. DOHENY, CHURCH
PROPERTY: MODES OF ACQUISITION (1927): P. Gun.DAY, THE CATIIOLIC CHURCH IN VmGINIA
(1815-1822) (1924); M. HOFFMAN, ECCI.ESIASTICAL LAW IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1868);
C. HOWELL, THE CHURCH AND THE ClvIL LAW (1886); S. HUDSON, LAW FOR THE CLERGY
(1877): C. LINCOLN, CIVIL I.Aw AND THE CHURCH (1916): D. Mcl.EAisH, THE LAws OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS AFFECTING CHURCH PROPERTY (1960): w. STRONG, Two LECTURES UPON
THE RELATIONS OF CIVIL LAW TO CHURCH POLITY, DISCIPLINE AND PROPERTY (1875);
R. TYLER, AMERICAN EcCI.ESIASTICAL I.Aw: THE I.Aw OF RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES, CHURCH
GoVERNMENT AND CREEDS, DISTURBING RELIGIOUS MEETINGS AND THE LAW OF BURIAL
GROUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES (1866); C. ZOLLMANN, .AMERICAN CHURCH LAW (1933);
Zollmann, Classes of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH. L, REv. 566 (1915):
Zollmann, Powers of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH, L. REv. 646 (1915):
Zollmann, Nature of American Religious Corporations, 14 MICH. L. REv. 37 (1915).
7. 2 J. DAVIS, CoRPORATIONS 224-25 (1971). It should be noted, however, that the
"Roman Law never reached the point in development at which the corporations were
included in the category of 'persons.'" Id. at 226. For a history of church associations
under the civil law, see C. BARTLE'IT, supra note 6, at 6-8, 13-16; B. BROWN, supra note
6.
8. For full text of edict, see note I supra.
9. "The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have moral personality by divine
institution itself; the other inferior moral persons in the Church obtain it either by the
very prescription of the law or by special grant of the competent ecclesiastical superior
given by formal decree for a religious or charitable purpose.'' Canon 100, § 1. This
English translation is taken from T.L. BOUSCAREN, A. ELLis, &: F. KOR'IH, CANON I.Aw:
A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 89 (4th ed. rev. 1963).
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common interests; no prior consent or approval by the state was required for the existence of a viable entity.10
In England, under the common law, things changed somewhat.
The rise of the strong independent sovereign led to the idea that
organizations exercising collegiate or corporate powers could exist
only with the prior approval of the sovereign. Since many of these
bodies had long existed as recognized juristic entities without the
express consent of the sovereign or at least without preservation of
the record of such approval, a fiction arose that permission had indeed been given by an earlier sovereign and that the charter had
subsequently been lost. These organizations are the so-called common law corporations.11
The requirement of prior approval by the state stressed the supremacy of the state over the church, a notion that was at variance
with the church's view of itself and with traditional medieval notions
of church-state relations. The Catholic Church saw itself as a moral
person, founded in divine law, with the power to administer its own
property independently of any sovereign.12 However, the Reformation, at least in England, destroyed any notion that the church existed as a separate spiritual entity immune from rule by the civil
authorities. The use of the corporate form was limited to organizations upon which the privilege had been expressly bestowed. The
church could no longer reside in England as a recognized entity with
the power to take and hold property. It was now reduced to the level
of any other voluntary, unincorporated association, dependent upon
the state's grant of power.
By the eighteenth century, the device of a charter incorporating
a local congregation had been developed. The Church of England
itself was not considered to be a corporate unit:
At common law the church of England, in its aggregate description,
is not deemed a corporation. It is indeed one of the great estates of
the realm; but is no more, on that account, a corporation, than the
nobility in their collective capacity. The phrase, "the Church of
England," so familiar in our laws and judicial treatises, is nothing
more than a compendious expression for the religious establishment
of the realm, considered in the aggregate under the superintendance
of its spiritual head. In this sense the Church of England is said to
have peculiar rights and privileges, not as a corporation, but as an
ecclesiastical institution under the patronage of the state.13
10.
11.
12.
13.

2 J. DAVIS, supra note 7, at 224-25; R. TYLER, supra note 6, at 57-58.
See J. ANGELL &: s. AME'S, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 55-56 (11th ed. 1882).
See text accompanying note 96 infra.
Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 325 (1815).
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As such, the Church was even more subject to the specific control of
the state with respect to temporal affairs. Each unit was to be incorporated separately, since the Church as a whole was not accorded the
corporate status. The requirement of separate incorporation for each
congregation was substantially mitigated by special laws incorporating ministers as corporations sole and by the granting of other privileges to the Church of England in its role as the established church.14
However, it is fair to say that English corporate history can be seen,
in part, as an attempt by the state to reduce the temporal power of
the church along with assertions of political and spiritual power over
it on other fronts.

B. Early Corporate Development in America
It hath been held (says Mr. Justice Blackstone) that if an uninhabited
country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English
laws then in being, which are the birthright of every subject, are
immediately there in force. But this must be understood with very
many and very great restrictions. Such colonists carry with them only
so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation
and the condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the general rules of inheritance, and of protection from personal injuries.
The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the property
of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and revenue
(such especially as are enforced by penalties), the mode of maintenance for the established clergy, jurisdiction of the spiritual courts,
and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary nor convenient to them, and therefore are not in force.15
Whether a matter of refinement or necessity, the English notion
that a corporation could exist only with the express prior approval of
the state was transmitted to the colonies, along with the idea that an
unincorporated association could not hold property in its own right
but could only prevail upon an individual to take the property in his
own name as trustee for the association. The colonies did, however,
differ in their treatment of the churches. While the prevailing English pattern of granting special charters to religious bodies meeting
with the approval of the king was repeated in most of the colonies, a
view of the ecclesiastical organization as a municipal corporation
known as the territorial parish was developed in New England, particularly in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine. The territorial
parish was charged with the public responsibility of maintaining the
14. See Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500 (1807).
15. 1 R. BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL I.Aw 415lll (9th ed. 1842).
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spiritual aspects of humanity. 16 Initially, the parish and the town
were a single geographic entity, but as time passed the two clearly
separated into distinct political entities.17 Since the parish was a
public corporation, membership, acquired by residence within the
boundaries of the parish, subjected the citizen to the duties one might
expect in a municipality, including the duty to pay taxes. "Such membership carried with it all the consequences, agreeable and disagreeable, which residence in a town or county implied. Residents of a
county or town were thus individually liable for its debts. A person
who recovered judgment against these public corporations could
levy execution against the property of any of their citizens."18 In
essence, the territorial parish was the spiritual arm of the state and,
as such, was subject to legislative control.19
Within the parish, the minister held title in fee simple to all land
dedicated as "parsonage lands, or lands granted for the use of the
ministry, or of the minister for the time being."20 He held this land
as a corporation sole, but "[t]he corporation was thus constituted
solely for the purpose of holding property for the parish, and [was]
nothing more than a trustee."21 The minister could grant an estate
for the duration of his term of office, but an alienation for any longer
period of time required the consent of the parish.22 During the interim period between ministers, the town or parish was entitled to
the custody of the property and the rents and profits from it.23
16. See Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 277-79
(1854). In this case the court also noted:
Each of these societies, or communities, were considered to be, and were in
fact, municipal, public, political corporations. They were governmental instrumentalities, composed of individuals, as component parts of the great community,
for the promotion of the general welfare of that community, and in which no
person had an interest, or was to derive a benefit, of a character particular or
individual to himself merely, but only in connection with, and as he participated
in, the welfare of the community generally; and not associations of individuals
as such, created for their mere personal or private advantage, like ordinary private
corporations; and they were established by the general assembly for the purpose
of accomplishing, within their respective limits, the objects for which they were
instituted, more conveniently than they could be accomplished, directly, by the
general assembly itself. The promotion of these objects was a public duty, enjoined
by law on the members of such corporations, which consisted of all the inhabitants
residing within their limits, with the exception of certain individuals in ecclesiastical societies, who were, by particnlar provisions, excused from taxation
for the religious objects of the society.
23 Conn. at 273. See generally C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 102-07.
17. See Sedgwick v. Pierce, 2 Root 432 (Conn. 1796); Inhabitants of the First Parish
v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445 (1811).
18. C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 106.
19. See Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 274 (1854).
20. Inhabitants of the First Parish v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445, 447 (1811).
21. C. Zou.MANN, supra note 6, at 108.
22. See, e.g., Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500 (1807).
23. See Inhabitants of the First Parish v. Duuning, 7 Mass. 445, 447 (1811); Weston
v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, 502 (1807).
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The territorial parish existed until the states disestablished the
church. In Connecticut, for example, the power of the legislature to
establish such a body was deemed to have been terminated by the
adoption of a constitutional amendment that stated that "no person
shall, by law, be compelled to join, or support, nor be classed with,
or associated to, any congregation, church, or religious association." 24
Outside of New England, the other colonies persisted in the use
of the special charter, which was granted only on petition to the
sovereign and at his discretion. 25 Many church bodies found it difficult to secure the corporate privilege because of the feeling of the
sovereign that incorporation was to be reserved for the established
church. For example, when Presbyterians in New York attempted to
secure a charter in July 1767, their request was denied by the Lords
of Trade in London, due to an uncertainty over whether such a grant
would constitute an impermissible establishment of a dissenting
church. The Lords stated, "That is a question of too great importance
for us to decide, but we are of opinion, that independent of this objection, it is not expedient, upon principle of general policy, to comply with the prayer of the petition, or to give the Presbyterian Church
of New York any other privileges or immunities than it is entitled to
by the laws of toleration." 26 The practice of granting special charters
continued unabated well into the nineteenth century27 and came to
an end only after states adopted general incorporation laws that included religious organizations within their scope.
One other aspect of the European heritage bears mentioning.
The idea has long persisted, at least in the United States, that there
was no such thing as a common law corporation-that is, a corporation that existed without the benefit of a prior grant of the corporate
privilege by the sovereign. It is not clear, however, that this was the
case. There was a sense in which local churches and ministers of the
24. Second Ecclesiastical Soc. v. First Ecclesiastical Soc., 23 Conn. 254, 274 (1854).
25. As early as 1696, a charter was given to the Dutch Reformed Church in New
York City. It incorporated the members of the Garden Street Church and is fairly
representative of the early charters granted to religious societies in the colonies. "[The
members] were authorized to have, take, acquire, possess, and purchase lands, tenements,
and hereditamcnts, or goods and chattels, and the same to lease, grant, alien, sell and
dispose of at their own will and pleasure, as other our liege people, or any corporation
or body politic within our realm of England or this our province, may lawfully do."
M. HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 103-04. On May 6, 1697, Trinity Church in New York
was incorporated by Governor Fletcher-the power to incorporate still residing at this
time with the executive and not the legislature. Id. at 295-310.
26. Id. at 131.
27. For example, an index to the statutes passed by the General Assembly of Rhode
Island up to 1862 shows a total of 288 charters granted to various religious societies,
the earliest dating from 1769. INDEX ro THE PRINTED Acrs .AND RESOLVES OF, AND OF
THE PETITIONS .AND REPORTS TO THE GENERAL i\ssE:MBLY OF THE STATE OF RHODE JsLAND
.AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, FROM THE YEAR 1850 TO 1862 xx-xxviii (1863).
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Church of England were deemed to be corporations without the
benefit of a specific act granting the use of the corporate privilege.
As shown by Mr. Justice Story in Town of Pawlet v. Clark28 and
Terrett v. Taylor, 29 local churches of the Episcopalian faith could
hold property, and their ministers were seized with title to the various grants in order that they might have a source of income:
At a very early period the religious establishment of England
seems to have been adopted in the colony of Virginia; and, of course,
the common law upon that subject, so far as it was applicable to the
circumstances of that colony. The local division into parishes for
ecclesiastical purposes can be very early traced; and the subsequent
laws enacted for religious purposes evidently pre-suppose the existence of the Episcopal church with its general rights and authorities
growing out of the common law. What those rights and authorities
are, need not be minutely stated. It is sufficient that, among other
things, the church was capable of receiving endowments of land, and
that the minister of the parish was, during his incumbency, seized of
the freehold of its inheritable property, as emphatically persona ecclesiae, and capable, as a sole corporation, of transmitting that inheritance to his successors. The church wardens, also, were a corporate
body clothed with authority and guardianship over the repairs of the
church and its personal property; and the other temporal concerns
of the parish were submitted to a vestry composed of persons selected
for that purpose.Bo

While it is true that such status did not truly approximate actual incorporation, it is also true that considerably more power accrued to
the local churches enjoying this status than was extended to other
voluntary associations under the common law.B1
28. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292 (1815).
29. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
30. 13 U.S. at 46. The same conclusion is reached in Town of Pawlet with respect to
the Episcopal church in Vermont.
31. There is, however, evidence that would, at the least, qualify Justice Story's
viewpoint. In Weston v. Hunt, 2 Mass. 500, 501 (1807), the court mentions an early
Massachusetts statute (Act of Feb. 20, 1786, ch. 12, [1783-88] Mass. Acts &: Laws 396)
that was supposedly modeled after an English provincial statute (28 Geo. II, c. 9 (circa
1754)). The Massachusetts version read:
That the deacons of all the several protestant churches, not being episcopal
churches, and the church wardens of the several episcopal churches, are, and
shall be deemed so far bodies corporate, as to take in succession all grants and
donations, whether real or personal, made either to their several churches, the
poor of their churches, or to them and their successors, and to sue and defend
in all actions touching the same; and whenever the ministers, elders or vestry,
shall in such original grants or donations have been joined with such deacons or
church wardens as donees, or grantees in succession, in such cases, such officers
and their successors, together with the deacons or church wardens, shall be deemed
the corporation for such purposes as aforesaid; and the minister or ministers
of the several protestant churches, of whatever denomination, are and shall be
deemed capable of taking in succession any parsonage land or lands, granted to
the minister and his successors, or to the use of the ministers, and of suing and
defending all actions touching the same • • • •
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The Catholic Church may well have been accorded a similar
status, in limited geographical areas, as a result of the 181932 and
189833 treaties between the United States and Spain. The 1819 treaty
involving the cession of Florida has been interpreted as a confirmation by the federal government of the juridical personality of the
Catholic Church.34 The 1898 treaty, following the Spanish-American
War, repeated this recognition. In subsequent litigation over property allegedly owned by the Church, the Supreme Court held that
Spain had vested the Church with a "legal personality" that allowed
it to hold property without the necessity of prior incorporation.35
It is not entirely clear that such recognition rested on either treaty;
one case involving a property dispute indicated that "[t]he corporate
existence of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the position
occupied by the papacy, has always been recognized by the Government of the United States.''36
The independent corporate capacity of the Catholic Church was
also recognized by the supreme courts of California37 and Texas.38
As recently as 1927, the Florida supreme court stated, "That the common law corporation sole is, under our statute adopting the common
law, the law in Florida today ... there can be no doubt ...." 39
C. The Growth of General Incorporation Laws
The difficulties inherent in any system that grants special favors
to a few led to the downfall of incorporation by special charter.40 It
32. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits with Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252,
T.S. No. 327.
33. Treaty of Peace with Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343.
34. "There can be no doubt of the power of the King of Spain to grant lands in
Florida while the province was his; nor of the capacity of the Roman Catholic Church
to take by grant. Our treaty with Spain recognises and ratifies all such grants made
prior to a certain day." 1 OP. ATIY. GEN. 563-64 (1822).
35. Santos v. Holy Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 212 U.S. 463 (1909);
Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
36, Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, 210 U.S. 296, 318
(1908).
37. Santillan v. Moses, I Cal. 92 (1850). But see City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca
Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 287 P. 475 (1930).
38. Blanc v. Alsbury, 63 Tex. 489 (1885); Blair v. Odin, 3 Tex. 288 (1848).
39. Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 887, 112 S. 846, 860 (1927).
40. The method of obtaining corporate capacity by special charters is subject to
grave abuse, not so much on the part of church societies, but in regard to other
private corporations. Not only was gross favoritism shown to particular persons in
granting charters to them, but the ever-increasing demand for such charters
threatened to swamp the Legislatures and prevent them from performing their
other duties. As a consequence, constitutional amendments were passed in many
states prohibiting the Legislature from granting any such special charters and
requiring them to pass general incorporation acts not only in regard to corporations for profit, but also in regard to all other corporations.
C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 134-35.
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seems probable that the spirit of separation and pluralism that swept
the country at the time of the American Revolution lent aid to the
enactment of general incorporation laws. The old system of special
charters had proven to be a means of establishing favored religious
bodies, and states began to enact statutes that granted the corporate
form to all bodies that could comply with certain minimal prerequisites. Such incorporated bodies were no longer seen as favorites of
the state but as sectarian agencies that had been accorded the benefit
of a secular legal form with which they might more effectively achieve
their stated goals and purposes. The reasons for this movement away
from the special legislative recognition of the established church to
the more readily available status of the private corporation were perhaps best expressed in the preamble to the New York Act of April
6, 1784:
Whereas by the thirty-eighth Article of the Constitution of the State
of New York, it is ordained, determined and declared, that free capital Exercise and Enjoyment of religious Profession and Worship,
without Discrimination or Preference should forever thereafter be
allowed within this State to all Mankind, provided that the Liberty
of Conscience thereby granted, should not be so construed, as to
excuse Acts of Licentiousness, or justify Practices inconsistent with
the Peace or Safety of this State.
And whereas, many of the Churches, Congregations, and religious
Societies in this State (while it was a Colony) have been put to great
Difficulties to support the public Worship of God, by reason of the
illiberal and partial Distribution of Charters of Incorporation to
religious Societies, whereby many Charitable and well disposed Persons have been prevented from Contributing to the Support of Religion, £or want of proper Persons authorized by law to take charge
of their pious Donations, and many Estates purchased and given £or
the Support of religious Societies, now rest in private hands, to the
great Insecurity of the Societies for whose Benefit they were purchased or given, and to the no less Disquiet of many of the good
People of this State.
And whereas, it is the duty of all Wise, Free and Virtuous Governments to countenance and encourage virtue and religion, and to
remove every Lett or Impediment to the Growth and Prosperity of
the People, and to enable every religious Denomination to provide
for the Decent and Honorable Support of Divine Worship, agreeable
to the dictates of Conscience and Judgment ....41
41. Ch. 18, preamble, [1784] N.Y. Laws 21. So popular did such acts become, that in
1866 a New York author stated: "Trinity Church, of the city of New York, and a few

other Protestant Episcopal Churches of the State, exist under special charters, but most
of the churches or societies of this denomination in the State of New York have been
organized under the general incorporating acts passed from time to time by the
State legislature." R. TYLER, supra note 6, at 59-60. The churches incorporated by
special charter continued to enjoy the privilege of incorporation. See M. HOFFMAN,
supra note 6, at 43.
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Two principal classes of religious corporations emerged under
the new general incorporation acts: the trustee corporation and the
membership corporation. Still later, yet a third form, the corporation
sole, appeared.42
The trustee form was initially adopted in most eastern states.43
It consisted of a body of trustees, usually elected by the congregation,
which was incorporated as a unit. All church property was vested in
the corporate body, which held it for the use and benefit of the
church, congregation, or society involved.44 This form grew out of
the common law practice of using trustees to hold property for a voluntary association incapable of taking or holding property in its own
name.411 By simply incorporating the trustees who already held title
to the property, the legislatures of the states that adopted this form
granted perpetual succession without the necessity of a transfer of
property to some different entity and without a change in existing
relationships.46
In theory, the use of the trustee form appeared simple and ideal.
The trustees would hold the property in trust for the benefit of the
congregation, and any deviations from the scope of the trust could
be enjoined by a court of equity.47 In practice, however, it was precisely the simplicity of the trustee form that created difficult problems of administration for the courts. During the nineteenth century,
as disputes began to arise among church members, courts were required to engage in theological discussions and to delve into the
mysteries of doctrine in order to determine whether trustees had
departed from a principle held to be fundamental to the original
faith of the congregation.48 As courts sought to determine the proper
use of church land, the substantial body of law known as the doctrine
of implied trust was developed.49
42. See text accompanying notes 204-12 infra. This statutory form is quite different
from the earlier common law corporation sole. See generally C. ZOLi.MANN, supra note 6,
at 107-10.
43. See C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 114-15.
44. Id.
45. Id. Cf. Hunt v. Adams, 111 Fla. 165, 149 S. 24 (1933); I.W. Phillips & Co. v. Hall,
99 Fla. 1206, 128 S. 635 (1930); Wilkins v. St. Mark's Protestant Episcopal Church, 52
Ga. 351 (1874).
46. C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 114-15.
47. See, e.g., Hanna v. Malick, 223 Mich. 100, 193 N.W. 798 (1923); First Church of
the Ilrethren v. Snider, 367 Pa. 78, 79 A.2d 422 (1951); Dissolution of Susquehanna Ave.
Presbyterian Church, 31 Pa. D. 8: C. (C.P. 1938); Franke v. Mann, 106 Wis. ll8, 81
N.W. 1014 (1900).
48. See, e.g., Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches, 1 Sandfd. 439 (N.Y. Ch. 1844).
49. Where a divided congregation held property under a trust deed stipulating
that the congregation be connected with or subordinate to a general church

1512

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1499

To compound matters, the trustees were seen as an entity separate
from the congregation. 50 The trustees were the corporation, and only
they could legally bind the church to a contract. The members of the
congregation might vote on internal bylaws or give advisory opinions
to the trustees, but such decisions were not legally enforcible in the
absence of approval by the trustees. 51
As a result of the difficulties inherent in the trustee form, New
York, by judicial fiat, in 1854 reinterpreted its Religious Incorporations Act and decided that the Act established the membership,
rather than the trustee, corporation.52 The membership corporation,
as the name implies, incorporated the membership, which could then
exercise authority directly without using a trustee. Control of church
property was now solely in the hands of the congregation, to be disorganization, the courts did not hesitate to enforce the trust in favor of the :earty
adhering to that organization, and it may have seemed but a small additional
step to imply, in the absence of an express trust, a dedication in support of the
particular form of ecclesiastical organization to which the congregation had
adhered prior to dispute. Many courts thus declared that church property no
matter how obtained was impressed with a trust for the maintenance of the forms
of ecclesiastical government to which the founders had adhered. Although this
rule resembled the English implied-trust doctrine, American courts emphasized
continuity of denominational affiliation rather than continuity of religious
tenets, and so generally refused to review the decisions of hierarchical church
judicatories on matters of doctrine.
Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L.
REv. 1142, 1149-50 (1962). See generally C. ZoLI.MANN, supra note 6, at 221-49; Casad,
The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1964);
Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts over Religious Issues, 20 Omo Sr. L.J. 508
(1959); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. R.Ev. 1142 (1962); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property DisputesSome Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113 (1965).
50. The church is the spiritual body of believers over which courts could have
no jurisdiction whatsoever; the society consists of all those who have associated
themselves together and who elect the trustees, whether they are of the church
or not; while the trustees, under whatever name they might be known, and
whether they are members of the church or the society or both or neither, are
the corporation, created for the express purpose of holding the property of the
society.
C. ZoLLMANN, supra note 6, at 117.
51. Each of these may act separately. The efficacy of their respective acts, or how
they are to be rendered responsible therefor, or how their respective duties or
obligations are to be enforced may sometimes become an important inquiry.
The employment of a pastor, may be submitted or allowed to the congregation at
large. Or it may be done by the Church, strictly so called. But unless the trustees,
as such, are parties to the contract, no action at law can be sustained against the
society, whatever other remedy may exist. The trustees may refuse their assent
to the employment of a pastor whom the Church or congregation may employ.
And if they do-no action lies-and the only remedy I can conceive of against
them, would be not against them as a corporation, but against them personally,
by removal from office, or in some other mode, for a dereliction of personal
duty. But it must be borne in mind, that although they as trustees are entitled to
the custody of the temporalities of the society; they ought not to act capriciously,
or arbitrarily.
Miller v. Trustees of the Baptist Church, 16 N.J.L. 251, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1837) (emphasis
original). See also C. ZOLLMANN, supra note 6, at 117.
52. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243 (1854).
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posed of in the manner prescribed by the local church's rules, bylaws,
charters, or custom. The New York court of appeals saw its decision
as a means of avoiding the implied trust doctrine, which it had come
to abhor. 53 In fact, the court viewed its action as a step forward in
the realm of religious freedom:
The act has in truth accomplished what the public sentiment in this
country would seem to demand, that is, the entire separation of the
£unctions of the ecclesiastical and temporal judicatories, and has
limited the former to their proper sphere of control over the spiritual
concerns of the people. I£ this statute is properly construed, we shall
have fewer examples of temporal courts engaged in the inappropriate
duty of deciding upon confessions of faith, and shades of religious
belief and points of doctrine too subtle for any but ecclesiastical
comprehension.54

The theory suggested by the court of appeals reached its logical conclusion in Petty v. Tooker, 55 when the trustees and a majority of the
membership of a Congregational church were. allowed to quit that
faith and, far from having to forfeit their interest in the congregational property, were permitted to dedicate the property to the
Presbyterian faith.
Not all states followed New York in trying to abolish the implied
trust doctrine, although the membership form of corporation began
to replace the trustee form in many jurisdictions. In most states, the
familiar implied trust doctrine was simply applied to the membership corporation; in fact, courts became increasingly willing to apply
the doctrine as the nineteenth century wore on.56 In New York, the
legislature soon reacted against the court of appeals' extreme construction of the Religious Incorporations Act. In 1875, the Act was
amended to require the trustees to administer the property of the
congregation according to the "discipline, rules and usages of the denomination to which the church members of the corporation be53. The Court stated:
The church is the body of believers ••• it was the intention of the legislature
to place the control of the temporal affairs of these societies in the hands of the
majority of the corporators, independent of priest or bishop, presbytery, synod, or
other ecclesiastical judicatory. This is the inevitable effect of the provision giving
to the majority, without regard to their religious sentiments, the right to elect
trustees, and to fix the salary of the minister. The courts clearly cannot dis•
franchise any corporator who possesses the qualifications prescribed by the
statute.
Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 263-64 (1854).
54. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 264 (1854).
55. 21 N.Y. 267 (1860).
56. See Note, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1142, supra note 49, at 1149-54.
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long."57 This change in wording, duly noted and applied by the New
York courts, resurrected the old implied trust notions. 58
As noted above, the theory of the membership corporation rested
on a distinction benveen the corporation and the church-that is,
between the temporal and the spiritual. This distinction was the
cause of the spectacular decision of the New York court of appeals in
Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Trustees of the Presbytery.59
The plaintiff in this case was a legal religious corporation established
in 1889. In 1908, friction benveen the local congregation and the
Presbytery of New York caused the Presbytery to dissolve the local
church, pursuant to its rights under the laws of the Presbyterian
Church and the New York Religious Corporations Law. Representatives of the Presbytery took possession of the church property, and
the plaintiff began suit to recover it. The court of appeals held that
the power of dissolution conferred on the Presbytery by the statute
involved the power to dissolve the church, "in the spiritual sense,"
but not the power to dissolve the religious corporation. The corporation, an entity distinct from the spiritual body of the church, was
created by the state, and only the state could dissolve it in the absence of an express statutory power in some other body to do so.
The Presbytery could hold the trustees of the corporation to account
and require them to administer the property subject to denominational uses, but it could not deprive them of physical possession.
Thus, while the corporate shell remained in existence, it had no
function, since the congregation of the church had been lawfully dissolved by the Presbytery. In the related case of Trustees of the Presbytery v. Westminster Presbyterian Church, 60 the old trustees were left
with the naked legal title to the property in question but were
obliged to administer it in favor of a new congregation formed by
the Presbytery.
D. Powers Under Early Statutes
A religious corporation may take, either by deed or will, real and
personal property to an amount limited by law. The statutes of the
States, inheriting the jealousy of large accumulation of property in
the hands of ecclesiastical persons and religious houses which was so
great an evil in England before, and even subsequent to the Reformation, have in many cases enacted that no religious society shall be
57. Ch. 79, § 4, [1875] N.Y. Laws 70.
58. See, e.g., First Reformed Presbyterian Church v. Bowden, 14 Abb. N. Cas, 356
(Sup. Ct. 1883).
59. 211 N.Y. 214, 105 N.E. 199 (1914).
60. 222 N.Y. 305, 118 N.E. 800 (1918).
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incorporated, with power to hold property yielding a greater annual
income than a specified sum. Of course, where this is the law of the
State, property acquired by such a corporation beyond the sum limited is liable to escheat to the commonwealth. Within that limit there
is the same freedom of acquisition which belongs to a natural person.
And where property has been held for the use of an unincorporated
religious society, it will, upon its subsequent incorporation become
vested at once, by force of the law, in that corporate body. No conveyance is necessary. So an agreement with individual members of a
society to convey land to them for the site of a church will be enforced after they are incorporated, and a conveyance will be decreed
to the corporate body.61
This statement by Mr. Justice Strong fairly reflects the situation
in the nineteenth century in most states that had enacted general incorporation laws. Regulation was the theme in many of these acts.
States varied in the scope and severity of the conditions imposed on
the exercise of the power to take, hold, lease, mortgage, and sell or
otherwise dispose of the corporation's property. Maine, for example,
required a prior appraisal by "three discreet persons, under oath, to
be elected by ballot at a legal meeting of [the] owners or proprietors"
of any property that the corporation wished to sell.62 Georgia gave the
corporation power to do any act not contrary to Georgia law, but
it limited land holdings to an amount "absolutely necessary to carry
into effect the objects of the incorporation." 63 Michigan placed no
limit on the amount of land that could be held, but it required a
prior judicial approval of any sale of property.64
Such limitations on land holdings remained as vestiges of the
English mortmain laws, which were originally inspired by the fear
that a corporation with perpetual succession could aquire vast
amounts of property and thereby monopolize the soil.65 While the
early restrictions have generally been abandoned, some states continue to impose various limitations on property holdings. 66
A further interesting aspect of the nineteenth century incorporation laws was the limitations placed upon the class of incorporators
and voting members of the resultant corporation. Many of the statutes required that this class could include only those who were of
W. STRONG, supra note 6, at 69-70.
Ch. 172, § 2, [1855] Me. Laws 197.
Act of Dec. 28, 1843, §§ 1-2, [1842-43] Ga. Acts 108.
Act of Feb. Ill, 1855, § 19, [1855] Mich. Laws 317.
See 3 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 437-38 (1950); C. ZOLLMANN, supra note 6, at 164-68; Joslin, "Mortmain" in Canada and the United States:
A Comparative Study, 29 CAN. B. REv. 621 (1951).
66. See text accompanying notes 161-64, 242-46 infra.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
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full age. 67 At least one statute restricted the class even further, to
males of full age and to Christians. 68 Some of these requirements exist
to the present day. 69

E. Two Case Histories
The abuses that may result from governmental manipulation of
the corporate privilege are strikingly illustrated by the experiences
of two churches: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) and the Roman Catholic Church.
I. The Mormons

The early corporate history of the Mormon Church is a prime
example of governmental regulation with a vengeance. The federal
government effectively stripped the Mormon Church of the use of
the corporate privilege primarily because of the Church's advocacy
of polygamy, a form of marriage considered by many non-Mormons
to be immoral.70
67. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ch. 12, § 1 (1857); Act of Feb. HI, 1855, § 2, [1855] Mich.
Laws 313. See R. TYLER, supra note 6.
68. E.g., 1 Mo. CODE OF GEN. LAws art. 26, § 88 (1860). See generally R. TYLER, supra
note 6.
69. For example, N.Y. R.EL1c. CoRP. LAw § 43(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972) reads as
follows:
Male persons of full age belonging to the parish, who have been baptized and
are regular attendants at its worship and contributors to its support for at
least twelve months prior to such election or special meeting or since the
establishment of such parish, shall be qualified voters at any such election or
special meeting, and also, whenever so permitted, by the canons of the diocese,
women having the like qualifications may vote at the annual elections and special
meetings of any parish of such diocese, whenever such parish shall so determine
in the manner provided in section forty-six of this chapter.
70. Congress denounced polygamy and enacted a statute making its practice illegal
in all United States territories. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § I, 12 Stat. 501. This
statute was upheld in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). Even today, a
person who has been convicted of bigamy is prohibited from voting in territorial
elections.
No polygamist, bigamist, or any person cohabitating with more than one
woman, and no woman cohabitating with any of the persons described as aforesaid in this section, in any Territory or other place over which the United States
has exclusive jurisdiction, shall be entitled to vote at any election held in any such
Territory, or other place, or be eligible for election or appointment to or be
entitled to hold any office or place of public trust, honor, or emolument in,
under, or for any such Territory or place, or under the United States.
48 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). This restriction is a carry-over from the period when the United
States was actively engaged in the persecution of the Mormon Church and its members.
The section was passed in 1882, Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 31, twenty
years after the Act of July I, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 ("An Act to punish and
prevent the practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the United States and other
Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Utah"), and has remained in effect ever since. For a discussion of early
decisions against polygamy, see L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM: 645-50 (rev.
ed. 1967).
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The Mormon Church was originally incorporated in 1851 by an
act of the so-called State of Deseret71-a provisional government set
up by the Mormons in what is now the State of Utah. After the
territorial government of Utah was set up by Congress,72 the territorial legislature reenacted and specifically approved the original
act. 78 In 1862, Congress passed an act that annulled this incorporation of the Mormon Church by the Utah territorial legislature.74
The federal act did not disenfranchise the Church, but was intended
to "annul all acts and laws which establish, maintain, protect, or
countenance the practice of polygamy, evasively called spiritual marriage however disguised by legal or ecclesiastical solemnities, sacraments, ceremonies, consecrations, or other contrivances." 75 The act
provided for a mandatory fine and sentence of up to five hundred
dollars and five years imprisonment for anyone convicted of bigamy.70
The act further provided:
[I]t shall not be lawful for any corporation or association for religious
or charitable purposes to acquire or hold real estate in any Territory
of the United States during the existence of the territorial government of a greater value than fifty thousand dollars; and all real estate
acquired or held by any such corporation or association contrary to
the provisions of this act shall be forfeited and escheat to the United
States: Provided, That existing vested rights in real estate shall not
be impaired by the provisions of this section.77
The fifty thousand dollar figure was well below the estimated wealth
of the Mormon Church.78
71. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 3 (1890).
72. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 51, §§ 1-17, 9 Stat. 453.
73. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 5 (1890). The text of the act may be found in 136 U.S. at 3-4.
74. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501.
75. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501.
76. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501.
77. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 3, 12 Stat. 501.
78. In Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 9 (1890), the government contended that the estimated worth of
the Church was approximately 3 million dollars. The irony of the entire affair is that,
after the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the legislation in question and the
appointment of the receiver thereunder, very little property was seized. The United
States Attorney for Utah reported in 1890 that the following property had been
seized:
4,732 shares of Deseret Telegraph Stock •••••••.............•• (no present value)
800 shares of city gas stock, par value ~100 • • • • • • • . • . • • . . . . . . . . . . • . • • $ 80,000.00
Cash on hand in various banks .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 291,812.83
Credits due on sheep • • . . • .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. .. .
10,000.00
Total • . . • . • • • • . • • • . . . . • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . $381,812.83
1891 ATrY. GEN. ANN. REP. 247.
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However, since the act had exempted from its scope all property
acquired by the Church under the original incorporation statute,79
it apparently did not have the desired effect of limiting the Church's
power. Therefore, in 1887, Congress amended the act to provide for
termination of the corporate status of the Mormon Church. The
Church's property, except for houses of worship, parsonages, and
cemeteries,80 was to escheat to the United States, and the proceeds
thereof were to be applied to the common school fund of the territory. 81 The Attorney General of the United States was given the
power to wind up the affairs of the Church and to secure the decrees
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the act.82 The act also provided
that religious organizations located in a territory of the United
States could hold only "so much real property for the erection or
use of houses of worship, and for such parsonages and burial grounds
as shall be necessary for the convenience and use" of the organization and required that such property was to be held in the names of
court-appointed trustees. 83
In a subsequent action brought by the Attorney General to enforce the act, the supreme court of Utah appointed a receiver to wind
up the affairs of the corporation and made findings substantially in
favor of the United States. 84 The church appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court of the United States and alleged that the act constituted an impairment of the contract between the Church and the
Territory of Utah. The Supreme Court affirmed85 in an opinion condemning the Mormons and their practices.86 The Court ruled that
79. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501.
80. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 13, 24 Stat. 635.
81. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, §§ 13, 17, 24 Stat. 635.
82. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 17, 24 Stat, 635,
83. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 26, 24 Stat. 635.
84. United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 5 Utah 361, 15
P. 473 (1887).
85. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890).
86. For example, the Court viewed the issues as follows:
It is distinctly stated in the pleadings and findings of fact, that the property
of the said corporation was held for the purpose of religious and charitable
uses. But it is also stated in the findings of fact, and is a matter of public notoriety,
that the religious and charitable uses intended to be subserved and promoted
are the inculcation and spread of the doctrines and usages of the Mormon Church,
or Church of Latter-Day Saints, one of the distinguishing features of which is
the practice of polygamy-a crime against the laws, and abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world. Notwithstanding the stringent laws
which have been passed by Congress-notwithstanding all the efforts made to
suppress this barbarous practice-the sect or community composing the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints perseveres, in defiance of law, in preaching,
upholding, promoting and defending it. It is a matter of public notoriety that its
emissaries are engaged in many countries in propagating this nefarious doctrine,
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charters granted by a territory are subject to the approval of Congress
and that, therefore, rights under the Utah charter are subject to congressional divestiture. Congress, in its role as parens patriae, has the
power to annul the acts of the territorial legislature, to confiscate
funds held by the Church under the charter, and to dispense any
money so obtained in accordance with the cy pres doctrine.87
In 1890, the Church submitted to federal law and abolished
the practice of polygamy by official decree.88 Congress eventually resolved, in 1893, to have the receiver, who had been appointed to hold
the confiscated funds, deduct his expenses and return the property
to the Church for use in charitable projects. 89
The entire affair amply documents the idea that the law regards
the incorporation process as a state-endowed privilege flowing from
the exercise of sovereignty. It also demonstrates that the state can
and may utilize the grant or withdrawal of such a privilege to force
ideological change or to punish those organizations of which it disapproves. 90 Although it is true that, except for section 17, which
and urging its converts to join the community in Utah. The existence of such a
propaganda is a blot on our civilization. The organization of a community for
the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism.
It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity
has produced in the Vvestern world. The question, therefore, is whether the
promotion of such a nefarious system and practice, so repugnant to our laws and
to the principles of our civilization, is to be allowed to continue by the sanction
of the government itself; and whether the funds accumulated for that purpose
shall be restored to the same unlawful uses as heretofore, to the detriment of the
true interests of civil society.
136 U.S. at 48-49.
87. The Court brushed aside the religious freedom argument on the ground that,
since the government had the right to prohibit polygamy in federal territorieit, a
church organization could not claim a right to use its funds for the purpose of
promoting and propagating the unlawful practice as an integral part of its religious
usages, 136 U.S. at 49-50.
88. The announcement read:
This practice [plural marriage] was established as a result of direct revelation, and
many of those who followed the same felt that they were divinely commanded so
to do. For ten years after plural marriage had been introduced into Utah as a
Church observance, no law was enacted in opposition to the practice. Beginning
with 1862, however, Federal statutes were framed declaring the practice unlawfnl
and providing penalties therefor. The Church claimed that these enactments were
unconstitutional, and therefore void, inasmuch as they violated the provision
in the national Constitution forbidding the government making laws respecting
any establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. Many
appeals were taken to the national court of final resort, and at last a decision
was rendered sustaining the laws as constitutional and therefore binding. The
Church, through its President, thereupon discontinued the practice of plural
marriage, and announced its action to the world, solemnly placing the responsibility for the change upon the nation by whose laws the renunciation had been
forced. This action has been approved and confirmed by the official vote of the
Church in conference assembled.
L. PFEFFER, supra note 70, at 649.
89. Jt. Res. 11, 53d Cong., 1st Sess., 28 Stat. 980 (1893).
90. While the United States may well have had the power to outlaw the practice of
polygamy, this power should not, as the dissent points out, have included the authority
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specifically dissolves the Mormon Church, 91 the 1887 act92 is phrased
in general terms, it is equally true that the act had only one apparent
goal.93 Such use of the corporate privilege as a club to enforce ideological conformity demonstrates the wisdom and fairness underlying
general incorporation laws.94

2. The Roman Catholic Church
The experience of the Roman Catholic Church in this country
presents an even more fundamental example of potential abuse of
the power to grant or deny the corporate privilege. In the case of
the Catholic Church, the factor that motivated governmental policy
was not that the church advocated what the government considered
to be immoral acts, but that it had a hierarchical structure that many
found offensive. The same desire for local, democratic control that
had helped fan the fires of the American Revolution swept through
the Catholic laity in many areas of the country in the early part of
the nineteenth century. The fact that the Church had long been attacked, both in England and in the colonies, for its foreign control
led many non-Catholics to support such a desire among the Catholic
laity. The result was that the Catholic laity and the non-Catholic
to confiscate the property of the Mormon Church: "Congress has the power to extirpate
polygamy in any of the Territories, by the enactment of a criminal code directed to that
end; but it is not authorized under the cover of that power to seize and confiscate the
property of persons, individuals, or corporations, without office found, because they may
have been guilty of criminal practices." 136 U.S. at 67 (Fuller, C.J., Field, Lamar, JJ.,
dissenting).
91. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 17, 24 Stat. 635.
92. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635.
93. See France v. Connor, 161 U.S. 65 (1896), where the Court held that at least
section 18 of the Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635, applied only to the territory
of Utah and not to any of the other territories.
94. The government remained adamant in its antipolygamy stance. In the enabling
act authorizing Utah to form a state government, Congress stated:
And said convention shall provide, by ordinance irrevocable without the consent of
the United States and the people of said State-First. That perfect toleration of
religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no inhabitant of said State shall
ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.
Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107. Utah's Constitution now contains almost
identical language. UTAH CoNsr. art. III, ,r first. When Grover Cleveland proclaimed
Utah a state in 1896, he carefully noted that the requirement of prohibition of poly•
gamous marriages had been fulfilled and iguored the other requirements. Proclamation
of Jan. 4, 1896, No. 9, 29 Stat. 876. Subsequently, the enabling acts of Arizona (Act of
June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557), New Mexico (Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 1110, § 2,
36 Stat. 557), and Oklahoma (Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, § 3, 34 Stat. 267) all con•
tained similar provisions. Today, in addition to Utah, five other states prohibit
polygamy by constitutional language. They are: Arizona (Aruz. CoNsr. art. XX, ,r
second), Idaho (IDAHO CoNsr. art. 1, § 4), Montana (MONT. CoNsr. art. III, § 4), New
Mexico (N.M. CoNsr. art. XXI, § 21), and Oklahoma (OKLA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 2).
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majority combined in an attempt to reduce the power of the hierarchy over its American parishioners.95 A stranger alliance would be
hard to imagine.
To put the problem in perspective, it is first necessary to grasp
traditional Catholic views concerning the church as a moral, juridical
personality: "The Catholic Church, and the Apostolic See are moral
persons by divine law, and have an innate right, independent of any
civil power, to acquire, to hold, and to administer temporal goods.
Single churches, and any other moral persons possessing juridical
personality by ecclesiastical authority have a similar right, governed
by the regulations of the sacred canons." 96 It became apparent that
the civil authorities in the United States simply would not accept
this viewpoint and that it had to be tempered to fit the prevailing
political realities:
It is a foregone conclusion that, if the property rights of the Church
are established by divine positive law, it is the will of God that they
be recognized in the United States. But, because it is impossible
under the Federal and State Constitutions of this country legally to
recognize any Church as being divinely established, some other basis
of recognition should be sought. This other mode of recognition is
to be found in what has already been said about the natural right of
men to hold property dedicated to religious purposes. In other words,
since the United States does not seem to assume in her legislation that
there is any divinely established religion, she should apply the principle which would have been applicable in case no special religion
had actually been established by God. 97
This meant, in practice, that the Church fully intended to see that its
property and membership in the United States were under the control of its hierarchy. 08 To nineteenth-century Americans, this meant
government by a foreign sovereign.99
The concept of democratic local lay control of the Church began
in North Carolina and soon spread to Philadelphia, New York, and
Norfolk, Virginia.100 The advent of the trustee corporation gave laymen their opportunity to seize physical control of the local churches.
As legal title to Church property became vested in local members
as incorporated trustees, they begin to assert control over the prop95. See generally P. DIGNAN, supra note 6; P. GUILDAY, supra note 6.
96. C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at I.
97. Id, at 9.
98. See id. at 22-23.
99. See, e.g., P. DIGNAN, supra note 6, at 192-95.
100. For general histories of the period, see P. DIGNAN, supra note 6; P.
supra note 6.

GuILDAY,
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erty and used this control as a means of asserting authority over the
hierarchy.101
Instead of proving to be a local aberration, the idea of lay control
spread. It became a matter of significant concern at the several Councils of Bishops that met from time to time throughout the nineteenth
century and the early part of the twentieth.102 The First Provincial
Council, held in 1829, declared: "Since lay trustees have too often
abused the power given them by the civil law to the great detriment
of religion and not without scandal to the faithful, we very greatly desire that in the future no church shall be built or consecrated, unless
it shall have been assigned by written instrument to the bishop in
whose diocese it is to be built, wherever this can be done ...." 103
The Fourth Provincial Council, held in 1840, again stressed this
solution and passed a decree "insisting upon the necessity of properly
securing all movable and immovable property and stating that if this
security could be obtained in no other way, then the property was
to be handed down by means of last wills and testaments, drawn up
according to the provisions of civil law."104 In 1843, at the Fifth Provincial Council, the earlier decree was modified to require that
"[e]ach bishop ... within three months after his consecration ..•
make a will securing the ecclesiastical property in his charge by the
laws of his State and . . . deposit a copy of the will with the archbishop. "105 The First and Second Plenary Councils, held in 1852 and
1866, again stressed the importance of holding the title of property
in the name of the bishop in whose diocese the property was located.106 However, by the time of the Third Plenary Council in 1884,
worry over the legal complications that could result from adherence
101. In some instances • • • Catholic laymen of that day carried over into the
trustee system the policy and regulations of non-Catholic American congregations, and gradually the fatal tendency of regarding their priests as "servants to
perform religious services" became apparent in their attitude. There was, moreover,
the belief present among many laymen that the clergy should be relieved of all the
worries and anxieties attendant upon the temporal management of church
affairs, and having excluded the priests from this material attention, they gradually
excluded them from all control of the property incorporated in the name of the
congregation. Once this right was claimed, as legally it could be in the courts, the
trustees arrogated the further power of dismissing any priest who attacked the
system and of selecting the clergymen who were amenable to dictation from
themselves. In this way, unworthy priests were intruded into congregations, and
when episcopal authority for the good of religion attempted to exercise a restraining and pruning hand upon such restrictions, attack, rebellion, and schism
were the inevitable result.
P. GUJLDAY, supra note 6, at 6-7.
102. See C. BARTLETI", supra note 6, at 56-59.
103. C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at 57.
104. P. GUILDAY, A HISTORY OF THE COUNCILS OF BALTIMORE (1791-1884), at 126 (1982),
105. Id. at 138.
106. See P. GuILDAY, supra note 104, at 180, 208.
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to this practice was ram pant. 107 The Council declared that, depending on the state's statute, the bishop could hold title to church property under several legal theories, either as a corporation sole, as trustee
for the diocese, or as an individual with absolute title in fee simple.108
Although in the eyes of the Church he would be merely the administrator of the property, under the law he would have all the rights
and duties of any other owner of property.109
Any fear that the Church might have had about legal complications proved to be well-founded. In 1888, the Roman Catholic archbishop of the diocese of Cincinnati was sued on personal debts
amounting to some 3.5 million dollars. The debts had actually been
incurred by his brother, the vicar-general of the diocese, who had
been accepting deposits of money from individual Catholics and
lending it out again at interest. The archbishop had assumed all of
the debts and made a general assignment of his personally owned
property for the benefit of his creditors. The assignee sued the bishop
to recover church property held by the bishop in fee simple, alleging
that it was included within the scope of the assignment. Denying
the requested relief, the trial court found that the church property
was, in reality, held in trust for the benefit of the various congregations that had originally purchased or donated it. The supreme court
of Ohio affirmed,11° citing canon and civil law to the effect that the
bishop had no power to bind church property for his personal debts.
Despite this victory, the Church wanted to be certain that there could
be no pillage of its property. In 1911, it passed a decree forbidding
bishops to hold church property in fee simple. 111
The entire problem arose because of the lack of incorporation
statutes satisfactory to the Church. The Church favored the use of
the corporation sole, but the notion of a one-man corporation, with
all of its concomitant powers, was not generally acceptable to civil
authorities,112 and the Church was generally unsuccessful in its efforts
107. C. BARTLEIT, supra note 6, at 23.
108 See id.
109. Id.
ll0. Mannix v. Purcell, 46 Ohio St. 102, 24 N.E. 595 (1888).
lll. "If there is no provision for corporations sole, then the Bishop, may, as a last
resort, hold the property as trustee. This trustee tenure is not expressly endorsed in
the Document of 1911 but it is by implication, since the only other possibility, fee
simple tenure, is abolished.'' B. BROWN, supra note 6, at 145.
112. See C. BARTLETr, supra note 6, at 79. "A corporation sole, or one composed of
one person, is not lawful in Michigan [not true anymore-see note 209 infra and
accompanying text]. This law is aimed at the 'one man power.' Churches might otherwise be tempted to lodge in some high dignitary unlimited power over property. The
Catholic Church avoids the force of this by having the fee simple title of all her
property vested in the bishop in his individual name and capacity." C. HOWELL, supra
note 6, at 8.
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to have the corporation sole adopted. The Church was placed on the
defensive in some areas, such as Pennsylvania, where statutes were
passed that required that the control of church property be vested
in the lay members of the various congregations. No better example
of the basic misunderstanding between church and state in this regard can be found than in a series of Pennsylvania cases involving
the Catholic Church.
The controversy arose in the following manner: In 1896, an unincorporated congregation transferred title to the church property to
the bishop of the diocese in trust for use of the congregation. Pennsylvania law required that
[w]hensoever any property, real or personal, shall hereafter be bequeathed, devised or conveyed to any ecclesiastical corporation,
bishop, ecclesiastic or other person, for the use of any church, congregation or religious society, for religious worship or sepulture, or
the maintenance of either, the same shall not be otherwise taken and
held, or inure, than subject to the control and disposition of the laymembers of such church, congregation or religious society, or such
constituted officers or representatives thereof ....118

In 1908, acting on a resolution passed by a majority of the congregation, ten lay members brought suit to compel the bishop to reconvey
title to them as trustees for the congregation. The bishop defended
on the theory that canon law required title to be held in his name,
and the trial court agreed and denied the writ. The supreme court
of Pennsylvania reversed,11 4 holding that, since canon law is subordinate to civil law, civil law must be followed when the two conflict.m
Since the bishop was only holding title under a dry, naked trust, the
beneficiary could terminate it in the fashion desired.
Following this decision, the congregation split into two opposing
factions, each of which held its own congregational meeting. The
faction favorable to the bishop purported to convey the church property to him; the faction opposed to the bishop declared that no such
reconveyance had been made. The probishop faction began suit to
compel the reconveyance of title, and, after holding an in-court election to determine the wishes of a majority of the original congrega113. 2 Pa. Digest of Laws 1860 (12th ed. 1895), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
81 (1965).
114. Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 70 A. 740 (1908).
115. "[E]cclesiastical rules and regulations, ••• except as they are aided by legal
conveyance, are ineffectual to divest any owner of his property.••• [I']he position taken
by defendant and sustained by the court, is in direct opposition to the law, whose
supremacy, over all ecclesiastical rules and regulations, when rights of property arc
concerned, is not to be questioned." Krauczunas v. Hoban, 221 Pa. 213, 225, 70 A. 740,
745 (1908).
§
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tion, the trial court found in favor of the probishop faction. The supreme court of Pennsylvania again reversed.11 6 It held that (I) by
conducting its own election, the trial court had abdicated its responsibility to determine which side had the authority to convey the property,117 and (2) the plaintiffs had not given their representatives
power to bind their group by such an election.118 The court then revealed that it had no concept of the scope of the disagreement between the parties:
Without any disposition to prejudge this case in any of its legal
aspects, and certainly not intending so to do, this much may be said
which, if it prejudice at all, prejudices equally. If this litigation involves any possible result worth a moment's controversy, it is concealed from our view. This may be a matter which concerns only the
parties themselves; but we remark upon it for the reason that the
case discloses sufficient to warrant an inference that neither side appreciates the insignificance of the stake for which they are contending. It is difficult to conceive of anyone bearing any relation whatever
to a religious body, quite so incapable of intermeddling with the affairs of the congregation, as a trustee who simply holds the legal title
to the church property. Such an one [sic] is trustee for no other purpose, and has nothing whatever, by reason of the fact that he holds
the legal title, to do with any of the affairs of the congregation, or
with the property itself, no matter whether he be prelate or layman.
Whoever he be, he holds the title not under or because of any rules
or regulation of any ecclesiastical body to which the congregation is
affiliated or connected, but under the law of the land which allows
the membership to indicate him as trustee.119
The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the matter by
proper procedure.
On the third try, the trial court found that the congregation had
voted at a lawfully called meeting to reconvey title to the bishop to
hold as trustee subject to the laws, rules, and usages of the Catholic
Church. Prior to the retrial, the bishop had excommunicated the
faction opposed to him and had placed the church under interdict
until such time as the property was conveyed to him. The supreme
court of Pennsylvania reversed again, finding that title could not be
conveyed in this fashion, since the majority had placed canon law
above civil law.120 The state simply did not recognize the temporal
authority of the bishop.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Mazaika
Mazaika
Mazaika
Mazaika
l\Iazaika

v.
v.
v.
v.
v.

Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 77 A. 1102 (1910).
Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 50, 77 A. 1102, 1104 (1910).
Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 51, 77 A. 1102, 1104 (1910).
Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 52-53, 77 A. 1102, ll04-05 (1910).
Krauczunas, 233 Pa. 138, 81 A. 938 (19ll).
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At this point, the opposition began to call non-Catholic ministers
to hold services in the still interdicted church. The faction that was
loyal to the bishop began suit to enjoin this activity; the trial court
granted relief, only to be reversed yet a fourth time.121 The supreme
court of Pennsylvania found that, since the bishop had refused to
recognize civil law and had simply been trying to have his own way
by means of the interdict, the decree should not have been granted.
The court closed by saying:
[B]ecause the evidence in the case makes it apparent that the purpose
of the bill is to accomplish indirectly that which we have repeatedly
declared may not be done, the plaintiffs in the bill have no standing
to ask equitable relief. If they desire to proceed further, their appeal
must be first to the ecclesiastical authority which has forbidden
Catholic worship in the church for rescission of the episcopal interdict
that inhibits it.122

By this time, six years had passed since the first suit had been instituted. The bishop, feeling further resistance was useless, rescinded
the excommunication order, lifted the interdict, and dropped his demand that title be reconveyed to him. He then appointed a new
priest, who was subsequently locked out by the opposition faction.
The opposition now claimed that the interdict had severed all of
the congregation's ties with the Catholic Church and that they were
free to use the property as they saw fit. The loyal faction sued to enjoin the use of the property by non-Catholics, and the trial court
again awarded it a decree. This time the supreme court of Pennsylvania affirmed.123 The court held that the property had been dedicated to the Catholic Church and that the plaintiffs had a perfect
right to prevent diversion from such use. The bishop, said the court,
could not sever the ties by decree, as the defendants seemed to argue,
since this would give him the power to subvert civil law that the court
had consistently denied him. 124
Thus, the final result was that, while the laity controlled temporal
affairs, it could do so only as a Catholic laity. The familar implied
trust doctrine was resorted to despite the language of the statute.
In subsequent litigation, the Pennsylvania supreme court recognized the power of the Catholic Church to extinguish125 and to di121. Novickas v. Krauczunas, 240 Pa. 248, 87 A. 686 (1913).
122. Novickas v. Krauczunas, 240 Pa. 248, 255, 87 A. 686, 688 (1913).
123. Novicky v. Krauczunas, 245 Pa. 86, 91 A. 657 (1914).
124. Novicky v. Krauczunas, 245 Pa. 86, 92-93, 91 A. 657, 659 (1914).
125. Canovaro v. Brothers of the Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76,
191 A. 140 (1937).
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vide126 its parishes. Thus, the Church was at least marginally recognized as a political entity with the power to create its own geographic
subdivisions. Other state courts gave like recognition under various
factual circumstances,127 while still others denied any temporal authority whatsoever to the Catholic hierarchy. 128

III.

RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY

In the foregoing section, an effort was made to portray, in at least
a summary way, the general history of the extension of the corporate
privilege to religious bodies in the United States. It has been a tangled
history, and, as experience, particularly in states like Utah and Pennsylvania, has demonstrated, legislative control over granting, ·withholding, or terminating the corporate privilege could be manipulated as a means of attempting to exert control over a particular
church body and its practices.
The long history of religious corporations has culminated in the
United States with almost universal granting to church bodies of the
privilege of incorporation, in accordance with procedures and limitations defined in the applicable legislation.129 The state statutes display great variety in the forms and methods of incorporation allowed
and in the powers that may be exercised by religious corporations.
Some states have statutes particularly designed for the incorporation
of ecclesiastical bodies,130 while others allow churches to incorporate
under either a general nonprofit corporation act131 or a general corporation act. 132 In the survey of the state laws that follows, an attempt
is made to give a bird's-eye view of the contemporary statutory pattern and also to give some indication of modem attitudes vis-a-vis
ecclesiastical organizations and their powers.
126. In re Trustees of St. Casimir's Polish Roman Catholic Church, 273 Pa. 494,
117 A. 219 (1922).
127. See Chatard v. O'Donovan, 80 Ind. 20 (1881); Klix v. Polish Roman Catholic
St. Stanislaus Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171 (Ct. App. 1909). Cf. Heiss v.
Vosburg, 59 Wis. 532, 18 N.W. 463 (1884).
128, See Levasseur v. Martin, 11 La. Ann. 684 (1856); Congregation of the Roman
Catholic Church of St. Francis v. Martin, 4 La. (4 Rob.) 62 (1843).
129. Only Virginia and West Virginia do not provide some form of corporate
status to ecclesiastical organizations. See text accompanying notes 139-72 infra.
1!10. See text accompanying notes 173-93 infra.
131. See text accompanying notes 306-27 infra.
132. Hawaii, for example, covers all corporations, profit and nonprofit, in one code.
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. ch. 416 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971). See also HAWAII R.Ev. STAT.
ch. 419 (1968).
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State Constitutional Provisions
I. General

Provisions in state constitutions relating specifically to religious
corporations are rare, beyond those that exempt churches from taxation or guarantee no discrimination bet1veen sects or denominations.133 Those states that do refer specifically to religious corporations
in their constitutions usually do so for minor reasons. 134 Often, constitutional guarantees are explicitly included in order to assure
continued enjoyment of rights and privileges recognized pursuant to
the federal constitution or by decisional law.135 In a few rare cases,
constitutional provisions serve to define procedures and rules of religious organizations.136
The constitutions of l:1V'o states contain provisions that relate to
landholding by ecclesiastical bodies. Kansas provides that title to all
property required for church use must be held by trustees elected
by the membership; this provision thus gives a preferred position to
the trustee form of corporation, at least where property ownership
is involved.131 Maryland's constitution restricts all sales of realty prior
to November 3, 1948, to, or in trust for, any ecclesiastical body to
133. For a discussion of state constitutional provisions relating to religion, see
C. ANTIEAu, P. CARROLL,&: T. Burum, R.ELlGION UNDER THE STATE CoNSrITUTIONS (1965).
134. For example, Alabama's constitution exempts "benevolent, educational, or
religious corporations" from the corporate franchise tax. ALA. CONST. art. 12, § 229.
135. For example, Vermont's constitution states:
All religious societies, or bodies of men that may be united or incorporated for
the advancement of religion and learning, or for other pious and charitable
purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the privileges,
immunities, and estates, which they in justice ought to enjoy, under such regula•
tions as the general assembly of this State shall direct.
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 64.
136. Massachusetts' constitution, for example, states:
As the public worship of God and instructions in piety, religion and morality,
promote the happiness and prosperity of a people and the security of a republican
government;-therefore, the several religious societies of this commonwealth,
whether corporate or unincorporate, at any meeting legally warned and holden for
that purpose, shall ever have the right to elect their pastors or religious teachers, to
contract with them for their support, to raise money for erecting and repairing
houses for public worship, for the maintenance of religious instruction, and for
the payment of necessary expenses; and all persons belonging to any religious
society shall be taken and held to be members, until they shall file with the
clerk of such society, a written notice, declaring the dissolution of their membership,
and thenceforth shall not be liable for any such grant or contract which may
be thereafter made, or entered into by such society;-and all religious sects and
denominations, demeaning themselves peaceably, and as good citizens of the
commonwealth, shall be equally under the protection of the Jaw; and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established
by law.
MAss. CONST. pt. 1, art. ill.
137. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 3.
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those sales made with the prior or subsequent approval of the legisIature.138

2. Virginia and West Virginia
The constitutions of Virginia139 and West Virginia140 are unique
in that they expressly prohibit the granting of a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination.141 The West Virginia
constitutional provision was carried over from the Virginia constitution. Both provisions reflect the influence of Jefferson and Madison,
who were skeptical of all forms of ecclesiastical power and saw the
use of the corporate charter as a means of acquiring property to implement such power. 142 Indeed, James Madison, when President,
vetoed an act for the incorporation of the Episcopal Church for the
District of Columbia on the ground that it would constitute a forbidden establishment of religion.143 Since at an earlier time the
Anglican Church, as the established church of Virginia and Maryland, enjoyed the status of a public corporation, whereas only local
lllS. Mn. CoNsr. Declaration of Rights art. 38. No consent is necessary after November 3, 1948, unless the legislature provides otherwise; so far it has not.
139. VA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 14:
The General Assembly shall not grant a charter of incorporation to any church
or religious denomination, but may secure the title to church property to an extent
to be limited by law.
140. W. VA. CoNsr. art. 6, § 47:
No charter of incorporation shall be granted to any church or religious denomination. Provisions may be made by general laws for securing the title to church
property, and for the sale and transfer thereof, so that it shall be held, used, or
transferred for the purposes of such church, or religious denomination.
141. Missouri originally had a similar provision in its constitution of 1820, which
stated that "no religious corporation can ever be established in this state." Mo. CoNsr.
art. 13, § 5 (1820). The Missouri constitution of 1865 stated:
[N]o religious corporation can be established in this State; except that by a
general law, uniform throughout the State, any church, or religious society, or
congregation, may become a body corporate, for the sole purpose of acquiring,
holding, using, and disposing of so much land as may be required for a house of
public worship, a chapel, a parsonage, and a burial ground, and managing the
same, and contracting in relation to such land, and the buildings thereon, through
a board of trustees selected by themselves; but the quantity of land to be held by
any such body corporate, in connection with a house of worship or a parsonage,
shall not exceed five acres in the country, or one acre in a town or city.
Mo. CoNsr. art. 1, § 12 (1865).
The constitution of 1875 stated:
[N]o religious corporation can be established in this State, except such as may be
created under a general law for the purpose only of holding the title to such
real estate as may be prescribed by law for church edifices, parsonages and
cemeteries.
Mo. CoNsr. art. 2, § 8 (1875). The Missouri constitution no longer contains such a
provision in any form.
142. See CHURCH AND STATE IN .AMERICAN HlsTORY 68-87 CT• Wilson ed. 1965).
143. For the full text of the veto message, see note 333 infra. For further discussion,
see text accompanying note 333 infra.
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congregations enjoyed a recognized corporate status in regard to the
holding of property, it was understandable that Jefferson and Madison would. view the extension of the corporate privilege to churches
of a particular denomination as a means of restoring special privileges associated with establishment.144
It is strange, however, that this prohibition on the incorporation
of religious bodies has been retained in the Virginia and West Virginia constitutions to this day in view of the over-all movement in
this country for permitting the incorporation of church bodies under general laws that are not designed to give a preferred position
to any particular church.
Nevertheless, religious bodies in Virginia and West Virginia have
not in fact been placed at a disadvantage as a result of the constitutional prohibitions. An explanation of the development in Virginia,
however, cannot be commenced without an understanding of the
law of charitable trusts in that state. In Trustees of the Philadelphia
Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors,1 45 the United States Supreme
Court held that a bequest in trust for an unincorporated religious association was void for vagueness, since the validity of charitable devises was, for indefinite beneficiaries, dependent on the Statute of
Elizabeth,146 which had not been adopted by the Virginia legislature
and was therefore not part of Virginia law. The Virginia supreme
court subsequently adopted this interpretation in Gallego's Executors
v. Attorney General,147 thereby causing the whole development of
the charitable trust doctrine in Virginia to be delayed and made dependent on statutory provisions.148 This is not the occasion to develop at length the further history of the decisional law in Virginia
respecting charitable trusts; however, it should be noted that, despite
varying and sometimes contradictory statements on the subject,140
the Virginia court seems to continue to adhere to the Gallego doctrine, except to the extent that it has been overruled or modified by
144. On the Anglican establishment in Virginia and Maryland, see E. GAUSTAD, A
RELl:GIOUS HlsrORY OF AMERICA 36-46, 74-79 (1966).
145. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819).
146. 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601).
147. 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832).
148. See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 322, at 647-49 (2d ed. 1964).
149. The Virginia court, in Protestant Episcopal Educ. Soc. v. Churchman's
Representatives, 80 Va. 718, 765-66 (1885), held that Gallego had been wrongly decided.
In Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125, 151, 10 S.E. 318, 325 (1889), the court declared that
the Churchman case had shown that Gallego was never the "law in this state." In
Fifield v. Van Wyck.'s Exr., 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897), the court distinguished
Churchman and Guthrie as referring to gifts to corporations only and reverted to the
Gallego doctrine.
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statute.150 In West Virginia, a statute was deemed to have overruled
the Gallego doctrine completely, and the use of the charitable trust as
a means of acquiring title for religious purposes seems to be fully
recognized in that state.151
Quite apart from the charitable trust question, the constitutions
of both Virginia and West Virginia recognize the authority of the
legislature to adopt legislation to permit the acquisition of title to
church property. Both constitutions provide that the state legislatures
may, by law, establish standards by which title to church property
may be secured.152 Pursuant to these provisions, legislation in both
states in effect authorizes the transfer of property in trust to trustees
to be used for religious purposes.1158 It is hard to perceive a distinction between this use of the trust device and the trustee corporation.
Moreover, the constitutional prohibitions against incorporation of
churches apply to ecclesiastical societies but not necessarily to other
church-related groups. 154 Also, the constitutional prohibition does
not bar the recognition of charitable bequests to a church incorporated under the laws of another state.155
In both Virginia and West Virginia, statutes overcome, at least
for certain specified purposes, the common law disability of voluntary associations to receive real property in their own names.156 The
statutes also allow the elected trustees of such organizations to sue
and be sued in their own names on behalf of their memberships for
damages to property or recovery of a debt. 157 The trustees also have
the power to take, hold, and encumber real property.158 In West
Virginia, the death of any or all of the trustees will not abate a suit
instituted against a religious body for or on account of real or personal property held or claimed by the trustees or for or on account
150. As recently as Maguire v. Lloyd, 193 Va. 138, 142, 67 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1951), the
Virginia supreme court stated that Gallego is good law unless modified by statute.
151. Sands v. Security Trust Co., 143 W. Va. 522, 534-35, 102 S.E.2d 733, 741 (1958),
citing W. VA. CODE§ 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE § 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970).
152. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14; w. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 47.
153. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 57-7 to ·8 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1, -7 (1966), as
amended, W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970).
154. Compare Jordan's Admrx. v. Richmond Home for Ladies, 106 Va. 710, 56 S.E.
7110 (1907), with Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, I S.E. 302 (1886).
155. See Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125, 10 S.E. 318 (1889); Osenton v. Elliott, 73
W. Va. 519, 81 S.E. 837 (1914).
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1 (1966).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-11 (1969); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended,
W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (Supp. 1970).
158. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-7, -11 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-7, -9 (1966), as
amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-7, -9 (Supp. 1970).
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of matters relating to the property,159 and the trustees are held accountable to the organization. 160
Land holdings by trustees are limited to a total of four acres per
congregation in an incorporated West Virginia city, town, or village161 and to :fifty acres per congregation in a Virginia city or town.162
Virginia limits congregations outside of towns to two hundred fifty
acres of land at any one time,1 63 while West Virginia limits such congregational land holdings to sixty acres. 164 Sales and mortgages of
land in Virginia by trustees of a diocese, congregation, church, or religious denomination may be accomplished only according to court
order.165 In West Virginia, sales and mortgages need not be courtapproved but there must be prior publication of intent in a county
newspaper.166 Virginia allows a member of the church, in his own
name and on behalf of the other members and subject to the approval
of the church's governing body, to bring a legal action against the
trustees to compel them to sell or mortgage the society's property in
accordance with the wishes of the society.167 West Virginia, on the
other hand, allows suit by the congregation whenever the trustees
propose to sell or encumber improperly the property of the society.168
A provision in the Virginia code that allows one individual to
hold title to church property in general169 creates, in effect, a corporation sole for hierarchical churches. The individual may deal with
the property as he wishes, so long as he acts within the rules of his
own denomination and the laws of Virginia. 170 It is indeed hard to
159. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7
(Supp. 1970).
160. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-7 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-7
(Supp. 1970).
161. w. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-8 (1966).
162. VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-12 (Supp. 1973). The city or town council may by ordinance
authorize up to fifty acres if the land is to be, and actually is, used for certain specified
purposes.
163. VA. CODE ANN.§ 57-12 (Supp. 1973).
164. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-8 (1966).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (1969).
166. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-10 (1966), as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10
(Supp. 1970). In lieu of such publication, the notice may be read at the principal
services of the church, parish, congregation, or branch on at least two separate occasions during a period of two weeks. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10 (1966), as amended,
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-10 (Supp. 1970).
167. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-14 (1969). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 57-13 (1969) (provides
for suits in equity against a trustee to compel him to apply any real or personal estate
for the use or benefit of the church).
168. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-11 (1966).
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (1969).
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-16 (1969).
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distinguish this statutory arrangement from the corporation sole as it
exists in many American jurisdictions.
West Virginia allows the property of an extinct church to be disposed of according to the terms of the original grant, the congregation's bylaws, or the bylaws of the denomination to which it was
attached, upon the suit in a circuit court of any trustee, member of
the congregation, or official of the denomination to which it was attached prior to extinction.171 Virginia has no similar provision.172
In summary, both Virginia and West Virginia give to their religious bodies powers very similar to those given through the use of
the corporate form in other states, even though under the constitutional provisions the former states may not authorize the incorporation of ecclesiastical societies.
B. State Statutory Patterns

I. General
State legislation granting the privilege of incorporation for religious purposes reveals a great diversity in types of corporations that
may be organized by churches, applicability to specific church bodies,
and limitations imposed on ecclesiastical corporations. Undoubtedly,
a large part of this variety is attributable to the long history of religious corporations and the carry-over of some ideas from the past.
For instance, the enactment of a special statute for the incorporation
of churches of a particular denomination may be seen as a carry-over
of both the practice of granting special corporate charters and the
established status of some early churches. In many cases, the present
legislation, which reflects, in some instances, a combination of statutes tailored to specific church bodies and general ecclesiastical corporations statutes, shows nothing more, perhaps, than a legislative
adaptation to the problem in successive eras and an unwillingness to
disturb organizations organized under earlier statutes. The legislation
probably also reflects a legislative concern that any attempt to impair
corporate privilege and powers under earlier statutes might be held
invalid as an impairment of the obligation of contracts. In any event,
as pointed out earlier, one cannot understand the kaleidoscopic pattern of religious corporations law in this country without an awareness of history.
171. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1966).
172. Since there are no cases and no statutory provisions relating to disposition of
the property of an extinct church, one can only speculate on what a court might do
when various people claim such property. Most likely it would award the property in
accordance with the cy pres doctrine.
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It should be noted here that some of the statutes discussed in this
paper do not deal only with religious organizations, but also include
within their scope charitable, fraternal benefit, or educational organizations. However, the religious element is clearly a major concern in all the statutes. The authors have attempted to distinguish
such statutes from those that are genuinely unrestricted (except for
the requirement that the corporations formed thereunder be nonprofit in scope) in their application. A good example of this latter
form is the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act.
2. Statutes Tailored to Specific Churches

Sixteen states173 provide specific corporate forms for certain
named religious denominations. Most of these states provide specific
statutory forms for only one to four denominations.174 At least three
states provide for fourteen or more separate denominations.175 New
York leads the field, with specific provisions for more than thirty-five
different denominations of varying degrees of size and reputation.176
Most of the states that have such specific laws are located east of the
Mississippi. Provisions for specified denominations are largely con173. They are Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
174. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-265 to -276, -279 to -28la (1960), as amended,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276, -28la (Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§§ 271-313 (1973).
175. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. ch. 458 (1967); N.J. STAT, ANN. tit. 16 (1939), as
amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit 16 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIC. CORP, LAW (McKinney 1952),
as amended, N.Y. RELIC. CoRP. LAW (McKinney Supp. 1972).
176. New York has statutory provisions for the following demoninations (all citations
are to N.Y. RELic. CoRP. LAw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIC, CORP, LAW
(McKinney Supp. 1972)): American Patriarchal Orthodox Church (§§ 51-a to 54-a);
Apostolic Episcopal (§§ 50 to 59-b); Baptist (§§ 130-40); Byelorussian Autocephalic
Orthodox Church in America (§§ 336-52); Christian Orthodox Catholic Churches of
the Eastern Confession (§§ 95-96); Christian Scientist (§§ 184 to 189-b); Church of
Christ (Disciples) (§ 206); Church of the Nazarene (§§ 273-79); Congregational Christian
(§§ 160-72); Evangelical United Brethren Church (§ 204-b); Free Baptist (§ 17); Free
Churches (§§ 180-83); Free Methodist (§§ 225 to 225-o); General Assembly of Spiritualists
(§§ 262-72); Holy Orthodox Church in America (§§ 50-aa to 50-mm); Holy Ukranian
Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Exile (§§ 175-79); Independent Associated Spiritualists (§ 210); Jewish (§§ 207-09); National Spiritualist Association (§§ 300-06); Orthodox
Church in America (§§ 105-08); Orthodox Greek Catholic (§§ 290-96); Presbyterian
(§§ 60-70); Protestant Episcopal (§§ 40-49); Reformed Church in America (§§ 110-16);
Reformed Dutch (§§ 110-16); Reformed Lutheran (§§ 110-16); Reformed Presbyterian
(§§ 110-16); Religious Society of Friends (§§ 201-a to 203); Roman Catholic (§§ 90-92);
Ruthenian Greek Catholic (§§ 100-02); Seventh Day Baptist (§ 17-a); Spiritual Science
Mother Church, Inc. (§ 211); Unitarian and Universalist Societies (§§ 400-14); United
Church of Christ (§§ 160-72); United Methodist (§§ 320-35); and United Society of
Shakers (§ 202),
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fined to older juridictions,177 which have a fairly lengthy history with
respect to ecclesiastical corporation laws,178 while newer jurisdictions
have concentrated on developing statutes that cover either ecclesiasti•
cal corporations in general179 or nonprofit corporations as a whole.180
The denominations most commonly provided for by specific state
laws are the Protestant Episcopal Church,181 Methodist churches of
various kinds, 182 the Roman Catholic Church,183 and the Eastern
Orthodox Church. 184
Most of the present laws providing for the Eastern Orthodox
177. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3, :12-1 to :12-31, :15A-1 to :15A-6 (1939),
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3, :12-1 to :12-31, :15A-l to :15A-6 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. REL1c. CORP. LAw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CoRP. LAW
(McKinney Supp. 1972).
178. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra. See generally M. HOFFMAN, supra
note 6.
179. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-123 to -137.1, -138 to -154 (1965), as amended,
WYO. STAT. ANN.§§ 17-123 to -137.1 (Supp. 1973).
180, E.g., WASH, REv, CoDE ANN. §§ 24.03.005-.03.905 (Supp. 1972).
181. CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN, §§ 33-265 to -267 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 27, § 114
(1953); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 274A-312Q (1973); MAs.s. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 39 (1971);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.251-.273 (1967): MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.17-.20 (1969);
NEV. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 82.300-.390 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:12-1 to :12-31 (1939), as
amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:12-1 to :12-31 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. R.Euc. CoRP. LAw
§§ 40-49 (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. REL1c. CORP. LAW §§ 40-49 (McKinney
Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 901-05 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§§ 901-05 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.04 (1957).
182. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276 (1960), as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33-268 to -276 (Supp. 1973) (Methodist Church); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3!128la (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Churches); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 313 (1973)
(Methodist Church); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-43 (1971), as amended, MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-43 (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Church); MrcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN,
§§ 458.21-.33 (Methodist Episcopal Church), 458.41-.55 (Wesleyan Methodist Church),
458.61-.74 (Methodist Protestant Church), 458.81-.93 (Free Methodist Church) (1967);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:6-1 to :6-3 (1939) (Free Methodist Church); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16:IOA-l to :lOA-15 (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist Churches); N.Y. R.Er.Ic. CoRP.
LAW §§ 225 to 225-o (Free Methodist Church), 320-35 (United Methodist Church)
(McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw §§ 225 to 225-o, 320-35 (McKinney
Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 861-66 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27,
§§ 861-66 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 861-66 (Supp. 1973) (United
Methodist Church); Wis. STA'I'. ANN. § 187.15 (1957) (Methodist Church).
183. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-279 to -281 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, §§ 11518 (1953); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 271-74 (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 67, §§ 44-46
(1971); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15-1 to :15-17 (1939), as amended, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15-1 to :15-17 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. R.Er.tc. CORP. LAw §§ 90-92 (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 90-92 (McKinney Supp. 1972); [1869]
R.I. Acts and Resolves 221, kept in force by R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-6-1 (1970); WIS. STAT.
ANN, § 187.12 (1957).
184. !LI.. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 187 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:481-:483 (1969);
MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 55 (1971): N.H. R.Ev. STAT• .ANN. §§ 292:15-:17 (1966); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 16:15A-1 to :15A-6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 105-08 (McKinney Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.17 (1957).
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Church came about as the result of a wave of legislation in the early
1950's. The purpose of the states that enacted such laws seems to have
been the protection of Eastern Orthodox property located in the
United States from domination and control by Communist governments in the USSR and Eastern Europe.186
It is understandable that the Roman Catholic Church has often
been singled out for specific statutory treatment. In the early history
of the country, legislation tended to discriminate against the Catholic
Church, since it was feared that, with its hierarchical control, it
would accumulate wealth and power incompatible with the American
idea of democracy.186 Earlier reference has been made to the extraordinary history of the Catholic Church under the incorporation
laws of Pennsylvania, which, at least as originally designed, were intended to assure the control of a congregation's property by laymen
rather than by the church hierarchy.187 Great changes have occurred since that time. In the first place, a number of states specifically
allow the incorporation of bishops of the church as corporations
sole.188 Most of the laws regarding the Roman Catholic Church provide for a mixed lay-clerical government for each parish, but the acts
are so drawn as to leave control of the church personal and real
property in the hands of the hierarchy.189
While there does not appear to be any recognizable pattern in
the state laws governing the incorporation of Protestant Episcopal
185. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S.
190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94 (1952).
186. See text accompanying notes 95-128 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 113-28 supra.
188. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 115 (1959); CAL. CORP. CODE § 10002 (West 1955). Cf.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973), which makes the bishop a quasi-corporation sole for the purposes of holding, alienating, and encumbering property.
189. See, e.g., N.Y. R.ELIG. CoRP. LAW § 91 (McKinney 1952), which states that the
government of the incorporated church shall be composed of the bishop and vicargeneral of the diocese, the rector, and two lay members of the congregation chosen
by the clerical trustees. In St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church v. l3ilanski,
19 Del. Ch. 49, 162 A. 60 (Ch. 1932), a similar statutory pattern was challenged as
"unreasonable and inequitable," The court replied:
I know of no authority by which this court would be justified in rebuilding the
corporate structure in the manner prayed. Whether as a matter of policy it is unjust and inequitable for a religious organization's temporal affairs to be controlled
by ecclesiastics rather than by the people of the congregation is a matter which
would admit of a conflict of views. What any individual's views about it may be
is of no importance. The law under which the corporation was created clearly
admits of ecclesiastical control, and it would be going a great length indeed for
this court to say that such a scheme of control is so unjust and inequitable as to
not be permissible, especially when the very congregation in whose behalf the
protest is now made assented to such control when the title was conveyed.
19 Del. Ch. at 53-54, 162 A. at 62.
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or Methodist Churches, it should be noted that these churches, like
the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches, do have a particular hierarchical structure and that whenever the attempt is made to fit corporate law to churches of this type, special and specific types of legislation are required. The congregational types of churches, on the other
hand, more readily fit under the general incorporation laws.
Incorporation laws tailored to reflect the internal rules of specific
churches present problems that general incorporation laws do not.
Once the law of a church becomes codified by a state, the church
loses its ability to modify its own rules, for a change in church structure has no legal effect without a corresponding amendment of the
statute. Further attention will be paid to this problem later, and
some consideration will be given to possible limitations that laws of
this type may place on the constitutional freedom of churches to
alter their own internal procedures.190
In some instances, specifically tailored provisions may conflict
with state constitutional provisions that prohibit the grant of special
charters by the state legislature. The likelihood of a constitutional
conflict increases as acts become more and more specific. For example,
Nevada recently enacted a statute that incorporated the Episcopal
Diocese of Nevada.191 The statute identifies the recipient of the grant
quite explicitly. The Nevada constitution contains a provision that
requires the use of general incorporation laws, as opposed to grants
of special charters:
The Legislature shall pass no Special Act in any manner relating to
corporate powers except for Municipal purposes; but corporations
may be formed under general laws; and all such laws may from time
to time, be altered or repealed.192

There appears to be at least one other state-Maryland-that has an
arguably similar situation.193 The potential problem in Maryland
190. At least one author has previously questioned the validity of incorporation
laws tailored to reflect the internal rules of specific churches. See Casad, supra note
49, at 459.
191. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 82.295-.2957 (1971).
192. NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
193. Instead of one law covering the entire Episcopal Church, Maryland has three
separate statutory schemes covering: the Diocese of Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 274A-297 (1973); the Diocese of Eaton, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 298-312 (1973); and
the Diocese of Washington, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 312A-312Q (1973). Art. m, § 48
of the Maryland constitution provides:
Corporations may be formed under general laws, but shall not be created by special Act, except for municipal purposes and except in cases where no general laws
exist, providing for the creation of corporations of the same general character, as
the corporation proposed to be created; and any act of incorporation passed in
violation of this section shall be void.

1538

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1499

seems more severe due to the great detail in which the statutes of
that state appear to regulate the day-to-day affairs of the corporations
involved.
3. Types of Corporations
Three basic types of ecclesiastical corporations are recognized in
the United States: (1) the trustee corporation, (2) the membership
corporation, and (3) the corporation sole.
A trustee corporation is a form of corporate body made up of
elected trustees or other officials with similar powers and duties. The
trustees themselves are the corporate body and wield all of the power
given thereto except to the extent that a statute limits the scope of
exercise of the power or imposes specified duties upon the trustees
themselves.194
The trustee corporation represents the earliest form of ecclesiastical corporation explicitly recognized by statute in the United
States.195 However, its use has been rather severely curtailed in recent
years, and today its use is restricted in both scope and geographical
area. Some eighteen jurisdictions, fifteen of them east of the Mississippi, recognize a form of the trustee corporation.196 Of the eighteen,
twelve197 recognize at least one of the other two corporate forms for
ecclesiastical bodies, and many of the twelve use the trustee form only
sparingly.198
194. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 172 (1971) (makes trustees of religious corporations expressly subject to the members of the congregation); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 458.29, .51, .68, .87, .104, .207, .257, .306, .406, .426, .457, .530 (1967) (several trustee
corporations provided for may not sell or mortgage real property without the approval
of the membership or a specific portion thereof, or of the hierarchy); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 86.130 (1969) (trustees may not sell or mortgage real property without prior court
approval).
195. See text accompanying notes 43-60 supra. See also C. ZOU.MANN, supra note 6,
at 113-16.
196. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-279 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp.
1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 102 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-502, -507 (1967);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 172, 182 (1971); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, §§ 256, 271, 282, 309,
312M (1973); :MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-41 (1971); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.159,
458.101, .257, .401, .421 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.01, .15, .16 (1969); Mo. ANN.
STAT. 352.060 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 82.320, 86.120 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 292:4, 306:4 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:1-2, :1-32, :1-34, :1-37, :1-40, :3-3,
:11-2, :11-18, :12-2, :13-1, :15-1, :15-9, :16-1, :16-9, :17-1, :17-5 (1939), as amended, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 16:11-18 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 41, 181 (McKinney 1952).
as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-2
(1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.18 (Page 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 701, 861,
901 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 861 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 187.05, .12, .15 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-138 to -139, -142 (1965).
197. Connecticut, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
198. For example, Connecticut limits its use to the Roman Catholic Church. CONN.
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The membership corporation, on the other hand, is recognized
in the vast majority of American jurisdictions. Some forty-three separate jurisdictions recognize it,199 thirty-one of them to the exclusion
of any other form of ecclesiastical corporation.200 The membership
corporation is essentially a corporate body made up of the members
of the congregation. The members, collectively, are the corporate
body and are akin to the shareholders of a business corporation, save
that there are usually no stock certificates issued,201 and one need
not buy into the corporation in the usual sense to become a voting
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-279 (1960). Massachusetts religious corporations are generally
membership corporations, M:Ass. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 47-49 (1971), but the Methodist
Episcopal Church, MAss ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 40-41 (1971), and the Roman Catholic
Church, 'MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 44-46 (Supp. 1972), are both trustee corporations.
Michigan limits its use to Baptist, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.101 (1967), Evangelical,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.451 (1967), Episcopal, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 458.257
(1967), and Reformed Protestant churches, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.401 (1967).
New York restricts its use to Episcopal, N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp.
1972), and Free churches, N.Y. R.ELIG. LAw CORP § 181 (McKinney 1952).
199. ALA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 124-25 (1959); AI.As. STAT. § 10.20.051 (1968); ARI2:.
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-451 (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1914 (1966); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 9200 (West 1955); CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-19-1, -20-1, -21-1 (1963); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-264(a) (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1012, -1029 (1967); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 617.013 (Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-2501 (1970); HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 416-20 (1968); !DAHO CODE § 30-1101 (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 163a7 (1971);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-7 (Burns 1972); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 504A.ll (Supp. 1972);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1701 (1964); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 273.187 (1972); LA. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN. § 12:210 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861, 3021, 3103 (1965); MAss. ANN.
Vi.WS ch. 67, §§ 47-49 (1971): MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1'78, 458.21, .41, .61, .81,
.201, .301, .451, .524 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.17, .21, .23, 317.07 (1969); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 5310.1 (Supp. 1972); MONT. R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 15-2311 (1967); NEB. R.Ev.
STAT. §§ 21-1910, -1927 to -1929 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-2, :2-17, :5-20, :lOA-3,
:lOA-4, :12-18, :15A-2 (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-2 to :15A-2 (Supp.
1973): N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 50-ee, 53-a, 63, 90, 95, 100, 106, 112, 132, 162, 1'77,
187, 201-a, 210, 211, 225-c, 265, 274, 294, 304, 323, 341, 403 (McKinney 1952), as amended,
N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 63, 106, 117, 201-a, 225-c, 323,341,403 (McKinney Supp. 1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-24-11 (1960); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1'702.04 (Page 1964), as amended, Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1'702.o4· (Page
Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 541, 562 (1953); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 61.091
(1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § '7'751 (Special Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § '7-6-2
(1969); s.c. CODE ANN. § 12-751 (Supp. 1971): S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 4'7-23-1 (196'7);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-601 (Supp. 1972); TEx. R.Ev. Cxv. STAT. ANN. § 1396-2.08 (1962);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6-26 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 2358, 2401 (1973); WASH. R.Ev.
CODE ANN. § 24.03.065 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01, .IO (195'7), as amended,
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 18'7.0I, .IO (Supp. 1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1'7-123 (1965).
200. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington. See note 197
supra for a list of those jurisdictions that use both forms.
201. Colorado does allow a form of joint stock religious corporation, CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 31-21-1 to -21-13 (1963); congregations may so incorporate, CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 31-21-12 (1963), and may issue stock of a value between ten and one
hundred dollars, CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-6 (1963). Some states do allow stock
issuance under general nonprofit corporation acts. E.g., AI.As. STAT. § I0.30.05l(a) (1968);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 504A.ll (Supp. 1972).
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participant in corporate matters. Questions of membership qualifications are generally left to the congregational bylaws or constitution.
It is probable that widespread use of the membership form has
been influenced by legislative familiarity with the form of the modem
business corporation, which is invariably a membership corporation.
Since the membership has a voice in corporate affairs, this form is
also more democratic than the trustee corporation and, accordingly,
has a greater appeal to the American psyche and sense of history. In
those states that provide specific corporate forms for certain church
bodies, the trustee form is generally reserved for hierarchical church
bodies202 and is only occasionally used for churches capable of being
designated as congregational.203 The use of the trustee form necessarily concentrates power in the hands of the few--often the representatives of the church hierarchy.
The third form, the corporation sole, is exactly what its name
implies-a one-man corporation. The corporation sole envisages the
incorporation of an office, with corporate privileges granted to the
individual lawfully holding the office.204 As a result, the corporate
name of the entity is generally the same as that of the office itself.
It is generally required that an officeholder be elected or appointed
according to the constitution or bylaws of the denomination to which
he belongs.205 Most likely, this requirement is inserted to ensure that
the corporate entity, with its concomitant powers and privileges, is
limited to parties officially recognized by the denomination in question. In practice, it would seem that the corporation sole should be
limited to hierarchical churches; this follows from the very nature of
the institution.206 However, most of the acts allowing its use contain
nothing that would so restrict its operation.207
202. Those hierarchical churches provided with the trustee form include: Christian
Reformed, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.451 (1967): Episcopal, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 458.257 (1967): Methodist, e.g., l\fu. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 313 (1973):
Reformed Protestant, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 458.401 (1967); Roman Catholic,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 33-279 (1960); and Ruthenian Catholic, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 16:16-1 (1939).
203. Those congregations that can be labeled congregational and are provided
with the trustee form include: Baptist, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 458.101 (1967):
Christian Scientist, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:3-3 (1939); and Spiritualist, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 16:17-1 (1939).
204. E.g., WASH, REV. CODE ANN. § 24.12.010 (1958).
205. E.g., AI.As. STAT.§ 10.40.020 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN§ 24.12.010 (1958).
206. The corporation sole is particularly suited to hierarchical denominations due
to the ability of the latter to identify officials in power. Denominations with a congregational polity do not, by their very nature, have the ability to identify one person
with the requisite authority to fulfill the office.
207. Some of the acts, however, do so restrict their operation. The Alabama statute,
ALA. CoDE tit. 10, § 116 (1958), implies the existence of a hierarchy. The Hawaii statute,
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Although the corporation sole was once looked upon with hostility in many parts of the country,208 in recent years it has begun to
win wider acceptance, especially in states west of the Mississippi. Today, it exists in some form in at least seventeen states.209 At least one
other state allows for trust succession in the name of one office,210
and one state specifically prohibits such trust succession.211 The corporation sole is allowed as an additional corporate form by some of
the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Non-Profit Corporation
Act.212
4. Provisions for Voluntary Associations
Besides providing for incorporated religious entities, some twentyfive jurisdictions have statutes that recognize unincorporated voluntary religious associations. 213 The provisions in question vary in scope
REv. STAT. § 419-1 (1968), speaks of incorporating a bishop or presiding elder
to administer the temporal affairs of his district. Michigan limits its use to the Roman
Catholic Church, MICH. CoMP. I..Aws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (1967), as amended, M:rcH. CoMP.
I..Aws ANN. §§ 458.1-.2 (Supp. 1973), and the Episcopal Church, MICH. CoMP. I..Aws ANN.
§ 458.271 (1967). Montana, MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2404 (1967), requires evidence
of hierarchical authority before incorporation. North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-5
(1965), limits the privilege to bishops and other officers.
208. See text accompanying note II2 supra.
209. A.LA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 115-23 (1959); AI.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); Aruz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-27 (1956); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 10000-15 (West 1955); D.C. CoDE
ANN. § 29-501 (1967); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 419-1 to -9 (1968); IDAHO CoDE §§ 30-1201
to -1209 (1967); M:rcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.1-.536 (Supp. 1973); MoNT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2413 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 84.010-.080 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 306:4 (1966) (not clear that such a corporation could be formed in New Hampshire, but nothing says otherwise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 61-5 (1965); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 61.055 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-762 (1962); UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1953);
WASH. REv. CoDE §§ 24.12.010-.040 (1958); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-146 to -154 (1965).
210. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 563 (1953).
211. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 703 (1967).
212. AI.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-501 (1967); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2403 (1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 61.055 (1971); UTAH
CoDE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1973); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 24.12.010-.040 (1958). For
a complete list of states that have enacted the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, see
note 306 infra.
213. AI.As. STAT. § 10.40.120 (1968); .ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-201 to -202 (1971); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-264a to -281 (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516
(1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 617.12-.13 (Supp. 1973); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 22-5504 to -5512 (1970); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-1711 to -1726 (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1711 to -1726 (Supp.
1972); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.010-.150 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2986
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, §§ 1-55 (1971), as amended, MASS. ANN. I..Aws ch. 67,
§§ 1-55 (Supp. 1972); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 5350-51 (1957); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1993
to -1995 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:1 to :12 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-39
(1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 61-1 to -6 (1965); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1715.02-.22 (Page
1965)," as amen'ded, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1715.02-.22 (Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 561-564.5 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), repealed as to
religious nonprofit corporations, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CoDE
HAWAII
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and purpose, but many of them deal with the common law disability
of a voluntary association to hold real property in its own name. 214
Statutes that give voluntary associations the right to take and hold
real property have two general forms: (1) recognition of the common
law device of granting the land to trustees to hold for the benefit of
a religious entity, 215 and (2) outright abolition of the disability by
conferring the power to hold land on the association itself.
Among the states that recognize the power of the trustees, some
simply provide for the vesting of title to property in the trustees and
their successors in office.216 Others go further and provide that the
association shall organize formally and appoint trustees to hold its
property and perform other proprietary functions on its behalf.217
Still other states recognize the duly appointed or elected trustees of
such associations as bodies corporate in and of themselves, even
though they have not gone through formal incorporation procedures.218 Other states simply recognize the right of the successors of
the original trustees to take and hold the property held in trust and
deny any right of the heirs of the original grantors to the property.219
States that allow the association to take and hold real property in
its own name are far fewer in number. 220 These states generally reANN. §§ 64-203 to -205 (1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-203 to -205 (Supp.
1972); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293a (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973);
VT. STAT. ANN, tit, 27, §§ 781-944 (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 781-944
(Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1 to -17 (1969), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57-1
to -17 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to -13 (1966), as amended, W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to -13 (Supp. 1970); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.07 (1957); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1-955 to -956 (1959),
214. For examples of the common law disability of a voluntary association to hold
real property in its own name, see Britton v. Jackson, 31 Ariz. 97, 250 P. 763 (1926);
Lael v. Crook, 192 Ark. 1115, 97 S.W.2d 436 (1936); Miller Lumber Co. v. Oliver, 65
Mo. App. 435 (1896).
215. For an example of this device, see Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 537, 7 Am. Dec.
99 (1815).
216. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.07 (1957).
217. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-264a to -28la (Supp. 1973); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 29-501 to -516 (1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972);
KY. REv. STAT, ANN. §§ 273.100, .110 (1972).
218. E.g., MASS ANN. LAws ch. 68, § 1 (Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:1
to :7 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 61-1 to -4 (1965). These provisions allow church officials
to act as a body corporate. Their power is subject to approval by the congregation in
major matters affecting the property itself. The New Hampshire provisions specifically
allow the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) to act as bodies corporate.
219. E.g., ALAS. STAT. § 10.40.120 (1968); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.16 (Page
1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-7-10 (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-154 (1965).
220. At the present time, only Mississippi and Pennsylvania so provide. MISS. CODE
ANN. § 21:5350 (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), repealed as to religious nonprofit corporations, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (Supp. 1973). See also text accompanying
note 216 supra.

August 1973]

Religious Corporations and the Law

1543

quire the congregation to organize, and the resultant legal entity is
granted rather limited corporate powers.221
Nine states provide for the passing of the property of unincorporated religious bodies in the event of dissolution of the local congregation or abandonment of its property.222 Generally, the property is
to go to the denomination to which the unit was attached at the time
of its demise.223 Some states, however, give power to the trustees of
the local unit to apply to the local circuit or superior court £or a
determination of the proper disposition of the property.224
The last significant provision relating to unincorporated religious
associations deals with the use of the property following schism within
the congregation. One provision allows each faction to use the property in proportion to its membership. 225 Others give the majority of
the congregation at the time of schism the right to take the property
and exclude the minority. 226
C.

Analysis of Statutes

I. Formation of Ecclesiastical Corporations

There are few, if any, special requirements for the incorporation
of ecclesiastical organizations; normally, ecclesiastical corporations
221. Mississippi, for example, has a provision that allows religious societies to
"organize." Miss. CODE ANN. § 5350 (1942). This provision is in addition to provisions
that specifically allow incorporation, MtSs. CoDE ANN. § 21:5310.1 (Supp. 1972), and
establishes an entirely different procedure. A separate institution is created with the
power to sue and hold real property in its own name. MISS. CODE ANN. § 5350 (1942).
Pennsylvania applies mortmain provisions to such bodies, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 31-33
(1965), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 10, §§ 31-33 (Supp. 1973), and requires the
property to be held according to the discipline of the faith to which the body is
attached. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21 (1965), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21
(Supp. 1973).
222. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.12-.13 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-17II, -1713a,
-1714, -1716a, -1716e, -1732, -1735 (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1714, -1732,
-1735 (Supp. 1972); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 273.120-.130 (1972); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-1993 to
-1994 (1970); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1715.05 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 103-04 (1965); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2293a (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, §§ 782-83, 821-25, 864-65, 904-05, 941-43 (1967).
223. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.12 (Supp. 1972).
224. E.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1715.05 (Page 1964).
225. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23.120 (1972).
226. ALA. CoDE tit. 10, §§ 104-13 (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-5504 (1970);
MISs. CODE ANN. § 1273-01 (Supp. 1972). Alabama's statute, popularly known as the
Dumas Act, was held constitutionally invalid in Goodsen v. Northside Bible Church,
261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966), afjd., 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967). It was also declared
unconstitutional in First Methodist Church v. Scott, 284 Ala. 571, 226 S.2d 632 (1969).
Mississippi's statute was held to violate the first amendment in Sustar v. Williams, 263
S.2d 537 (Miss. 1972).
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and regular business corporations are formed in a similar fashion.
The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act provides a typical procedure
for incorporation. Under this Act, one or more parties may serve as
incorporators227 and must sign articles of incorporation containing
the name of the corporation, its period of duration, its purpose, the
address of its initial registered office, the name of the original registered agent, and the number, names, and addresses of the initial
board of directors and the incorporators.228 Duplicate originals of
these articles are filed with the secretary of state, who endorses them,
files one, and returns the other with a certificate of incorporation.229
An organizational meeting for the corporation must be called on
three days' notice following the issuance of the certificate of incorper
ration.230
A popular variant of the above method is for the members of the
organization to pass a resolution signifying an intention to incorporate and then to elect trustees who will go through the process of
incorporation.231 This method is generally used for trustee corporations,232 but it may also be used for membership corporations.238
Some states require that the articles be submitted to the local district or superior court rather than to the secretary of state for final
approval. 234 In such cases, the articles must generally be filed with
the county in which the property is- located, as well as with a statewide agency, usually the secretary ofstate.235
Many states require that certain meeting and notice requirements
be fulfilled prior to any actual incorporation of an ecclesiastical organization. Maine, for example, requires a meeting, for which notice
has been given,236 to determine whether the congregation or organization shall incorporate, and incorporation is allowed only upon the
227. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 28 (rev. ed. 1964).
228. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 29 (rev. ed. 1964).
229. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 30 (rev. ed. 1964).
230. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 32 (rev. ed. 1964).
231. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 124-25 (1958). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101
(Supp. 1968).
232. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-505
(1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 256 (1973).
233. See Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59, 61 S.2d 101 (1952).
234. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 125 (1958); Arur. STAT. ANN. § 64-1905 (1966).
235. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.062 (1966); N.Y. REuG. CORP. LAW § 180 (McKinney
1952).
236. Seven days' written notice of the meeting to elect incorporators and the
initial board of directors must be given by posting the notice at the church. ME. R.Ev.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2982 (1964), as amended, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2982 (Supp.
1972).
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favorable vote of the members. 237 A further requirement found in
states that allow separate corporate forms for specific denominations
is the prior approval of an official of the church hierarchy (if the congregation is affiliated with a hierarchical denomination) before the
articles can be filed with the state.238
Many states add a procedural requirement for the formation of
the corporation sole-namely, a listing of the estimated value of the
property of the corporation upon application for use of the corporate
form. 239 Succession to the corporate powers is accomplished for the
most part by the filing of a certificate of appointment or election with
an appropriate state or county official.240 The problem of interim
management of the corporation between the death of one official and
the certification of the next is not dealt with by any statute.

2. Powers of Ecclesiastical Corporations
The powers granted by statute to ecclesiastical corporations are
fairly standardized throughout the United States and are not radically different from powers given to regular business corporations.
The most basic power-the right to hold, manage, and dispose of real
property-is universally granted to religious organizations, even in
those jurisdictions where churches are not allowed to incorporate.241
Even so, this power is by no means unqualified in every jurisdiction.
Many states limit the amount of property that a religious organization may hold at any one time. 242 The forms of limitation vary from
237. ME. R.Ev. STAT, ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861-62 (1964), as amended, ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2861 (Supp. 1972).
238. E.g., MICH. CoMP. L\ws ANN. § 458.21 (1967) (Methodist Episcopal Church);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:15A-2 (Supp. 1973) (Russian Orthodox Church); N.Y. R.ELIG.
CORP. LA.w §§ 50-aa, 50-ee (McKinney 1952) (Holy Orthodox Church).
239. E.g., ALAS. STAT. § 10.40.040 (1968); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-148 (1965).
240. E.g., ALAS. STAT, § 10.40.110 (1968); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-153 (1965).
241. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7 (1969);
VA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1 (1966). See text
accompanying notes 139-41 supra.
242. See ARIZ. R.Ev. STAT, ANN. § 10-454 (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-272
(Supp. 1973) (Methodist Church only); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-501 (1967); IDAHO CoDE
§ 30-1106 (1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2863, 2983 (1964); l\fAss ANN. LA.ws ch. 67,
§§ 21 (religious societies), 25 (meeting house), 41 (Methodist Episcopal), 46 (Roman
Catholic) (1971); MICH, CoMP. LAws ANN, §§ 548.27 (Methodist Episcopal), 458.49
(Wesleyan Methodist), 458.67 (Methodist Protestant), 458.87 (Free Methodist), 458.205
(Presbyterian), 458.257 (Episcopal), 458.307 (Congregational), 458.425 (Christian Re•
formed), 458.457 (Evangelical), 458.529 (United Missionary) (1967); MISS. CoDE ANN,
§ 5351 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.160 (1969) (religious
associations); NEV. REV. STAT. § 82.360 (1971) (Episcopal); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 295:7
(voluntary corporations), 306:10 (religious societies), 306.11 (Quakers) (1966); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. § 543 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-6-8 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-758 (Supp. 1971); WYO, STAT. ANN. § 17-125 (1965). New York does not seem to
have any limitations at present, although it does have a provision that allows the state

w.
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restrictions on the total dollar value of the property that the organization may hold, 243 to restrictions on the total acreage it may hold,244
to a general restriction that such organizations may not hold more
property than is "reasonably necessary" for their purposes.245 A few
states also spell out specifically the kinds of property that may be
held by a religious body.246
The methods by which a church may alienate or encumber its
property are also restricted in many states.247 The purpose of such
to investigate whether the amount of property held by one religious corporation
"exceeds the amount authorized by law." N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw § 14 (McKinney 1952).
243. Such provisions take two forms. Some restrict the total value that can be held:
Massachusetts limits the Roman Catholic Church to 100,000 dollars worth of property
per congregational corporation, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 46 (1971), and the Methodist
Episcopal Church to 50,000 dollars total assets, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 67, § 41 (1971):
Rhode Island limits all churches to 150,000 dollars total assets, R.I. GEN. LA.ws ANN.
§ 7-6-8 (Supp. 1972). Others restrict yearly income from real and personal property:
Connecticut limits the annual income of the Methodist church to 15,000 dollars, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-272 (Supp. 1973); Maine limits the yearly income of incorporated
parishes to 3,000 dollars, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2863 (1964); New Hampshire
limits the annual income of religious associations to 7,500 dollars, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 306:10 (1966), and the annual income of Quaker monthly meetings to 10,000 dollars,
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 306:11 (1966). The constitutional validity of limiting certain
churches and not others-as is the case in Connecticut, Maine, and Nevada, among
other states-appears highly questionable.
244. For example, Nevada restricts religious associations to one block of real property
if located in a city or to ten acres if located in the country. NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.160
(1967). The District of Columbia limits religious societies to one acre. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 29-501 (1967).
245. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-454 (1956); IDAHO CODE § 30-1106 (1967); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 67, §§ 21, 23, 41, 46 (1971); MICH. COMP. IAws ANN. §§ 458.27, .49, .67, .87, .205,
.257, .307, .425, .457, .529 (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966); N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN.
§§ 295:7, 306:10, :11 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 543 (1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-758
(Supp. 1971).
246. Mississippi limits church holdings to the following: the church and a reasonable
quantity of ground thereunder; schools and parish houses, and a reasonable quantity
of ground thereunder; the minister's house and the ground thereunder; hospitals and
grounds; colleges and grounds; orphan asylums and grounds; camp facilities and
grounds; cemetery lands; and denominational headquarters and grounds. MISS. CODE
ANN. § 5351 (1942). Missouri limits churches to a reasonable quantity of land for
assembly, libraries, laboratories, and other rooms. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.130 (1966).
247. ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 128-29 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-509 to -510 (1967);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 172, 180 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:207D (1969); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2982, 2984 (1964), as amended, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 2982, 2984 (Supp. 1973); MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, §§ 290, 309e, 312n (1973): MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.162 (church trustee corporations), 458.29 (Methodist Episcopal),
458.51 (Wesleyan Methodist), 458.68 (Methodist Protestant), 458.89 (Free Methodist),
458.104 (Baptist), 458.207 (Presbyterian), 458.257 (Episcopal), 458.306 (Congregational),
458.406 (Reformed Protestant), 458.426 (Christian Reformed), 458.457 (Evangelical),
458.530-.531 (United Missionary) (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.12 (religious associations-trustee corporations), 315.17 (Episcopal), 315.20 (Episcopal cathedrals), 315.24
(religious associations-synods), 317.26 (nonprofit corporations) (1969); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 86.130 (1969); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 306:7 to :8 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:1-6
(general), 16:2-8 (Baptist), 16:3-4 (Christian Scientist), 16:5-22 (Evangelical Lutheran),
16:10A-ll (United Methodist), 16:11-3 (Presbyterian), 16:12-4 (Episcopal), 16:13-2
(Reformed), 16:15-5 (Roman Catholic Congregation), 16:15-4 (Roman Catholic Diocese),
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restrictions is to protect the membership from hasty or unwise decisions by boards of directors or from diversion of property from its
intended use. Accordingly, the limitations take the form of requirements of specific percentages of voter approval that must be met before property may be sold or encumbered,248 or at least prior approval by an unspecified percentage before any action can be taken.249
Some jurisdictions even require the prior approval of a local court
before a sale becomes valid. 250 In some states, congregations affiliated
with a hierarchical church must have the prior approval of the hierarchy before a sale or mortgage can be consummated.251
A second group of powers, the powers to contract and to incur
debts, are widely recognized by the states.252 Again, it should be mentioned that these powers are not given without some restrictions. As
noted above,253 debt-contracting schemes are often subject to prior
congregational approval before they become valid.
Other powers given to ecclesiastical corporations generally include the right to maintain and alter a seal,2 ;;4 the right to dissolve
16:16-7 (Ruthenian Greek Catholic), 16:17-6 (Spiritualist) (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT•
.ANN. §§ 16:1-6 to :17-6 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CoRP. LAw §§ 12(1) (general), 12(2)
(Episcopal), 12(3) (Roman Catholic), 12(4) (Ruthenian Greek Catholic), 12(5-a) (Presbyterian), 225-l (Free Methodist), 333 (Methodist), 351 (Byelorussian Orthodox), 411
(Unitarian and Universalist) (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. RELIG. CORP: LAw
§§ 12(1)-411 (McKinney Supp. 1972); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1702.39 (Page 1964); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7547 (Special Supp. 1972); 'WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.12(5) (1957). See also
text accompanying note 311 infra.
248. See, e.g., MICH. Co.MP. LAws ANN. § 458.51 (1967), which requires approval by
two thirds of the members present and voting at a meeting of a Wesleyan Methodist
Church called for the purpose of considering the proposed sale or encumbrance. The
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act requires approval by a two-thirds majority for a
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the corporation. MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRPORATION Acr § 44 (rev. ed. 1964).
249. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 12:207D (1969).
250. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT.§ 86.130 (1969); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW§ 12(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1972) (if a lease or mortgage is to be for more than five years' duration).
251. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS .ANN. § 458.257 (1967) (Episcopal); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 16:IOA-ll (Supp. 1973) (United Methodist); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAw § 12(2) (McKinney
1952).
252. All jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Mississippi, grant these powers
specifically or impliedly. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT• .ANN. § 31-19-2 (1963); FLA. STAT.
ANN, § 617.021 (Supp. 1972). Mississippi gives religious corporations only such powers
as are specified in the articles of incorporation and are "reasonably necessary to accomplish the stated purpose." MISS. CoDE ANN. § 5310.1 (Supp. 1972).
253. See note 247 supra and accompanying text.
254. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-19-2, -20-1 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.021
(Supp. 1972); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-26 (1968); !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 180 (1971);
!ND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-l.l-4(b) (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 504A.4 (Supp. 1973); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12:207 (1969); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 931 (Supp. 1972); MICH.
CoMP. I.Aws ANN. § 450.183 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 315.04 (1969); MoNT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 15-2305 (1947); NEV. REv. STAT. § 86.120 (1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 295:3
(1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-4 (1939); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-14-30 (1953); Omo REv.
CoDE ANN. § 1702.12 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 15, § 7502 (Special Supp.

1548

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 71:1499

and distribute the corporation's assets,255 the right to merge with
foreign or domestic ecclesiastical corporations,256 the right to perpetual duration, 257 the right to a limited duration should the organization so desire, 258 the right to sue,259 the right to borrow money,260
the right to give security for the corporation's own borrowing,261 and
the right to improve any real property the corporation may mrn.262
Ecclesiastical corporations generally have the power to regulate
their own internal affairs without outside restrictions. However, while
the power to administer internal affairs has been thought to be a
constitutionally protected right of religious organizations,263 many
states do endeavor to establish standards or requirements to promote
procedural safeguards in order to protect minority rights. Such procedural regulation often takes the form of notice requirements for
meetings264 and elections,265 annual meeting requirements,266 methods for the removal of boards of directors or trustees,267 requirements
1972); R.I. GEN. LAws .ANN. § 7-6-7 (1969); s.c. CODE .ANN. § 12-758 (Supp. 1971);
S.D. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 47-22-54 (1967); WIS. STAT• .ANN. § 187.12 (1957); WYO. STAT•
.ANN. § 17-150 (1965). See also MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 5(c) (reV'. ed.
1964).
255. See notes 270-96 infra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 297-205 infra and accompanying text.
257. E.g., AI.As. STAT. § 10.20.011 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE .ANN. § 24.03.035 (Supp.
1972). Cf. ALA CODE tit. 10, § 118 (1958). This is a fairly standard power, although some
states are silent on the point. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-453 (1956).
258. The typical provision states that the corporation shall have perpetual duration
unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1005
(1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 931 (Supp. 1972); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 24.03.035 (Supp. 1972). New Mexico limits the over-all duration of nonprofit corporations to 100 years. N.M. STAT• .ANN. § 51-14-ll0 (195ll).
259. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 84.050 (1967); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1702.12 (Page
Supp. 1972). In a few states the power must be considered to be granted by implication
only. See, e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 10-454 (1956).
260. E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 10, § 118 (1958); AI.As. STAT. § 10.40.070 (1968); ARiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 10-423 (1956); FLA. STAT• .ANN. § 617.021 (Supp. 1972). A few states appear
not to grant this power. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-7 (1963); Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 352.130 (1966).
261. E.g., DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 27, § 102 (1953); MoNT. CODES ANN. § 15-2406 (1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15 (Supp. 1971).
262. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 5(d) (1964 rev. ed.). For a list of states
that have adopted this Act, see note 306 infra.
263. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
264. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:230 (1969) (requires ten to sixty days' written
notice of all meetings).
265. E.g., DEL. CODE .ANN. tit. 27, § 105 (195ll) (requires ten days' notice prior to
election of trustees).
266. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-30 (1965) (requires an annual meeting of members);
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 13 (rev. ed. 1964).
267. E.g., D.C. CoDE ANN. § 29-504 (1967); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 169 (1971); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 61.127 (1971).

August 1973]

Religfous Corporations and the Law

1549

concerning the eligibility of an individual to be an incorporator,268
or requirements for voter eligibility.269

3. Dissolution Provisions
Nearly all states have statutory provisions for dissolution procedures, either voluntary or involuntary, for ecclesiastical corporations.270 The provisions display great variety, running the gamut
from those that seem to be almost an afterthought to those that are
highly sophisticated and patterned after similar sections in many
business corporation acts. There are four principal procedures for
dissolving an ecclesiastical corporation: (1) involuntary dissolution
initiated by officers or members of the corporation, (2) involuntary
dissolution initiated by the state attorney general or other public
official, (3) voluntary dissolution upon vote of the membership of
the corporation itself, and (4) dissolution by church officials upon
extinction of the local corporate unit. Five states also allow dissolution when a creditor of a congregation has reduced a claim to judgment and the claim remains unsatisfied.271
Involuntary dissolution initiated by members or officers of the
corporation is generally allowed if a deadlock among the members or
directors of the corporation has prevented the corporation from functioning, or if the corporation has committed an ultra vires act or
has otherwise failed in accomplishing its stated purposes.272 This
type of dissolution procedure is a refinement borrowed from regular
business corporation acts and has been adopted in slightly less than
half the jurisdictions.273
268. For example, Maryland requires that the trustees who incorporate be elected
by members over 21 years of age. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256, 262-63 (1973). New
Hampshire requires five or more persons of "lawful age" to be incorporators. N.H.
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 292:1 (Supp. 1972).
269. For example, New York limits voters to those of "full age" unless otherwise fixed
by statute or in the articles of incorporation. In no event, however, may the voting
age be fixed at less than 16 years. N.Y. REuG. CORP. I.Aw § 4a (McKinney Supp. 1972).
Note that New York requires Episcopal Church voters to be male, of full age, and
regular contributors to the parish. N.Y. REuG. CORP. I.Aw § 43(6) (McKinney Supp.
1972), quoted in note 69 supra.
270. The states that have no such provisions are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico.
271. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:251 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-53 (1965); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.50 (Page 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7982 (Special Supp. 1972);
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 47-26-23 (1967). See also MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr
§ 54 (rev. ed. 1964).
272. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 416-128 (1968); LA. REV. STAT. § 12:251 (1969).
273. HAWAll REV. STAT. § 416-128 (1968); LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 12:251 (1969); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 315.38 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-53 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
7981 (Special Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 47-26·22 (1967). In addition, those
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Involuntary dissolution initiated by the state attorney general or
other public official is a widely used method. 274 Generally, the grounds
for allowing dissolution on this basis are fraud in the procuring of
the corporate franchise, abuse of the use of the corporate privilege,
failure to file an annual report with the secretary of state or other
designated public official, termination of the period of duration specified in the articles of incorporation, and general abuse of state law
or violation of the public interest.275 As an outgrowth of his powers
to oversee charities-a carry-over from the common law276-the attorney general of the state is usually given the power to institute dissolution proceedings.277 Some states give this power to the prosecuting attorneys of the county in which the property of the corporation
is located278 or to the state official charged with overseeing corporations within the state.279
Voluntary dissolution upon a vote of the members of the corporation is generally allowed for any reason deemed proper by the members. In some states such dissolution may go forward without a court
order of any kind,280 while other states require court intervention
to ensure the payment of all creditors and to oversee the proper dis,.
tribution of the corporate assets. 281 The majority of members rejurisdictions that have adopted all or parts of MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION A<::r §
54(a) (rev. ed. 1964) (all states, except Arkansas, listed in note 306 infra) have such a
provision.
274. ARK, STAT. ANN, § 64-1918 (1966); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 33-264f (Supp. 1973);
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 416-122 (1968); !LL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, § 190 (1971); IND. ANN, STAT.
§ 23-7-1.1-66 (1972); Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.180 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.62
(1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.240 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-50 (1965); S.D. COMP.
LAws § 47-26-16 (1967).
275. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-66 (1972).
276. For a discussion of the attorney general's role with respect to charitable trusts,
see 4 A. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 391 (3d ed. 1967).
277. All states, except Hawaii, listed in note 274 supra allow the attorney general
to act in this manner.
278. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1918 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.240 (1966). In both cases,
the attorney general also has the power of dissolution.
279. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-122 (1968) (director of regulatory agencies).
280. COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 31-19-7 (1963); CONN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 33-264e (Supp.
1973); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 416-121 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT, § 23-7-1.1-33 (1972); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 308:1-:6 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:2-16 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-44
to -49 (1965); Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN.§ 1702.47 (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 7961 (Special Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-763 (1962); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 4726-1 to -11 (1967). In addition, all the states that have adopted all or parts of MODEL
NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Ac:r § 49 (rev. ed. 1964) (all states, except Arkansas, listed in
note 306 infra) have a provision of this sort. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.45 (1969).
281. FLA, STAT. ANN. § 617.05 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:250 (1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317.47 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 352.190 (1966); N.Y. RELIG, CORP,
LAw § 18 (McKinney 1952); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN, § 2293(a) (1971). See also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 564.3 (1953).
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quired for a dissolution vote varies from simple282 to two-thirds283
to three-fourths. 284 It would seem likely that the relatively high percentages required are intended to ensure that the threat of dissolution will not arise upon every disagreement or controversy within
the corporate unit.
Dissolution by hierarchical officials upon extinction of the church
or abandonment of the church premises is allowed in several states.285
Most likely, the purposes of such laws are twofold: (1) to protect
abandoned property from deterioration through exposure and neglect, and (2) to ensure the hierarchy that the property will be preserved for the use of other members of the same denomination.
Generally, all dissolutions of ecclesiastical corporations are accomplished by petition to a court of specified jurisdiction-usually
the court of the county wherein the bulk of the corporate property
is located.286 Most states require notice to creditors of the soon-tobe-defunct corporation and satisfaction of all outstanding debts before the remaining corporate assets may be distributed. 287 Only after
payment of debts and formal court approval of the plan of distribution will the court order the dissolution or the secretary of state grant
a certificate of dissolution. 288
Perhaps the plan of distribution is the most crucial question.
Many states allow the trial court to make all determinations concerning the distribution of property.280 In such cases, it would seem logical for courts, having no statutory guidelines, to rely upon plans presented to them by the parties and upon traditional notions of cy
282. E.g., Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 1702.47(D) (Page Supp. 1972).
283. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT, ch. 32, § 163a43 (1971).
284. HAWAII R.Ev. STAT,§ 416-121 (1968).
285. IOWA CODE ANN. § 504.11 (1949); KAN. STAT, ANN. §§ 17-1713, -1713(c), -1716,
-1716(c), -1716(e) (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT, ANN. § 17-1716 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT•
.ANN. §§ 17-l716(h), -1734, -1737 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP, LAWS ANN. §§ 458.29, .47,
.69, .89, .107, ,209, .308, .532 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 16:2-21, :5-26, :6-3, :lOA-14, :12-16,
:13-16 (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 16:2-21 to :13-16 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT.
ANN, tit, 18, § 564.2 (1953); VT. STAT, ANN. tit. 27, §§ 782, 822, 865, 905, 942 (1967), as
amended, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 865, 905 (Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.08, ,10,
.15(4) (1957).
286. E.g., FLA. STAT, ANN. § 617.05 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT, ANN. §§ 17-1712, -1713(b),
-1716(b) (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1715 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT• .ANN. tit. 27, § 782
(1967); WASH, R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 24.03.260 (Supp. 1972).
287. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1051 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-7-1.1-33 (1972);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 7961 (Special Supp. 1972).
288. See, e.g., S.D. Cm,IP. LAws ANN. § 47-26-10 (1967); WASH. R.Ev. CODE .ANN. §
24,03.245 (Supp. 1972).
289. E.g., ARK. STAT• .ANN, § 64-1918 (1966); FLA, STAT. ANN, § 617,05 (Supp. 1972);
HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. §§ 416-121 to -125 (1968).
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pres.290 One state provides that the property will escheat to the
state,291 while at least one other jurisdiction gives the property to the
heirs of the original donors. 292 Neither of the latter two solutions
seems perfectly satisfactory.
At the other extreme are the jurisdictions that specify that, upon
the demise of a local congregation, the property will go to specified
denominational organizations.293 Denominations with a congregational polity are specified more often than those with an hierarchical
polity.294 These provisions have the advantage of providing security
for the denominations affected, although problems could arise in the
event of a name change or a merger unless such contingencies were
290. For a discussion of the evolution of the cy pres rule in the United States, see
E. FISCH, THE CY PRES DocrRINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950). In Maryland, the court
is instructed by statute to employ the cy pres doctrine. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 127
(1973).
291. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.180 (1967).
292. D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-511 (1967).
293. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1711 (Baptist, to Kansas Baptist Convention), 17-1713a
(Colored Baptist, to Missionary Baptist State Convention), 17-1714 (Church of Christ,
to Kansas Christian Missionary Society), 17-1716a (Congregational, to Kansas Congrega•
tional and Christian Conference), 17-1716d (United Brethren in Christ, to Kansas Annual
Conference of United Brethren in Christ) (1964), as amended, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 171714 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1732 (German Baptist Brethren, to Church
of the Brethren, District of Kansas), 17-1735 (Church of Nazarene, to District Advisory
Board of the Church of the Nazarene) (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 458.29
(Methodist Episcopal, to Annual Conference), 458.47 (Wesleyan Methodist, to Annual
Conference), 458.69 (Methodist Protestant, to Annual Conference), 458.89 (Free Methodist, to Annual Conference), 458.107 (Baptist, to Baptist Convention), 458.209 (Presbyterian, to Presbytery), 458.308 (Congregational, to Michigan Congregational Conference),
458.532 (United Missionary, to Annual Conference) (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN, §§ 16:2-19
(Baptist, to New Jersey Baptist Missionary Corporation), 16:2-21 (Seventh-Day Baptist,
to Seventh-Day Baptist Missionary Society), 16:5-26 (Lutheran, to Synod), 16:6-1 to
:16-3 (Free Methodist, to New York Conference of the Free Methodist Church), 16:lOA14 (United Methodist, to Annual Conference), 16:12-16 (Episcopal, to Annual Convention), 16:13-14 to :13-17 (Reformed, to Classis) (1939), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16:2-21, :5-26, :lOA-14 to :13-17 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. RELIG. CORP. I.Aw§§ 16 (Episcopal,
to Bishop), 17 (Free Will Baptist, to Central Association of Free Will Baptists), 17-a
(Seventh Day Baptist, to Seventh Day Baptist Missionary Society), 59-b (Apostolic
Episcopal, to Metropolitan Synod of the Apostolic Episcopal Church), 50-MM (Holy
Orthodox, to Metropolitan Synod of the Holy Orthodox Church in America), 206
(Church of Christ, to New York Christian Missionary Society), 225-M (Free Methodist,
to Annual Conference), 352 (Byelorussian Orthodox, to Diocesan Council) (McKinney
1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw §§ 16, 352 (McKinney Supp. 1972); VT.
STAT. ANN. §§ 781-85 (Baptist, to Vermont Baptist State Convention), 821-29 (Congregational, to Vermont Domestic Missionary Society), 864-66 (Methodist, to Troy Annual
Conference of Methodist Church), 941-44 (Universalist, to Vermont &: Quebec Universalist-Unitarian Convention) (1967), as amended, VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 864-65 (Supp.
1972); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 904-05 (Episcopal, to Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Vermont)
(Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.10 (Congregational, to Wisconsin Congregational
Association), 187.12(10)-(11) (Catholic, to Bishop), 187.15(4) (Methodist, to Annual Conference) (1957).
294. A probable explanation for this situation is that no statutes are really necessary
to determine where the property of a local congregation that belonged to a hierarchical
polity should go upon the demise of the congregation.
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foreseen when the legislation was drafted. Some states have avoided
this problem by simply stating that the property is to be administered
by the denomination to which the congregation was attached, 295 or
by a similar religious group. 296
4. Ability To Merge or Consolidate
In many jurisdictions, ecclesiastical corporations are allowed to
merge or consolidate with other ecclesiastical corporations.297 Procedure varies from state to state, but the over-all pattern is very similar. Generally, the plan of merger must be approved by the board of
directors or trustees of the corporation and then submitted to a vote
of the membership. A favorable vote by the percentage of the membership specified by the statute is necessary to effectuate the merger. 298
There are variants to this pattern, which tend to rob the membership of its power to reject a proposed merger or consolidation.299 For
example, Maine requires only that the board of directors of each nonprofit corporation approve the plan of merger and submit it to the
state attorney general for approval.800 This procedure is basically undemocratic, despite the fact that the attorney general is supposed to
represent the public interest. It is doubtful that a proposal for merger
would be closely scrutinized by a public official busy with what he
undoubtedly considers to be more important matters of state. At
least one state allows religious hierarchies to order the consolidation
of parishes or congregations.301 Other jurisdictions require the ap295. IOWA CODE ANN. § 504.11 (1949); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 21-1993 (1970); N.H. R.Ev.
STAT. ANN. § 308.9 (1966).
296. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:249B (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 564.3 (1953).
297. Merger is not specifically allowed in the following states: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island.
298. E.g., Omo REv. CooE ANN. §§ 1702.41-.42 (Page 1964) (requires endorsement by
trustees of a plan of merger, notice to members of a meeting to approve the plan, and
majority approval by membership of the plan). Most states require a two-thirds membership approval. See, e.g., MODEL NON·PROFIT CoRPORATION Ac:r § 40 (rev. ed. 1964).
299. Several states use procedures that do not require membership approval prior
to an effective merger. New York requires supreme court approval. N.Y. RELIG. CoRP.
LAw § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1972). New Jersey and New Mexico require only the
approval of the board of directors. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-20 (1939); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-14-35 (1953). Missouri has a unique system, which requires a plan of merger,
approval by the membership, and submission to a local circuit court for approval. The
circuit court may call upon an independent, competent person to give an opinion on
the desirability of the merger. Once the circuit court gives approval, articles of merger
must be filed in the county wherein the property is located and with the secretary of
state. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.150 (1966).
300. ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 961 (1964).
301. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 293, 312p (1973). Some states have granted the power
impliedly by case law. See, e.g., Chatard v. O'Donovan, 80 Ind. 20, 41 Am. R. 782
(1881); Klix v. Roman Catholic Parish, 137 Mo. App. 347, 118 S.W. 1171 (1909).
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proval of hierarchical officials before the merger or consolidation
becomes effective.802
Most jurisdictions require that notice of a merger or consolidation be filed in the county where the property of the merged corporation is principally located303 or with a designated state oflicial.804 The
filing requirement is essentially a method of giving notice to prior
and prospective creditors and others interested in the affairs of the
corporation. Prior creditors are also protected in almost every jurisdiction by the statutory requirement that the successor corporation
succeed to all liabilities and assets of the merging or consolidating
corporations.805
5. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act

The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act (MNPCA), propounded
by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association, has been adopted in whole or in part in eighteen separate
jurisdictions in the United States,306 and one can probably safely predict that other states will adopt it in due course. Many of the states
that have adopted it are clustered in the Midwest and West, although
there is no clear-cut pattern as to its adoption. A few jurisdictions
that have adopted the MNPCA have also retained older acts covering ecclesiastical corporations.807
302. E.g., N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. LAw § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (Episcopal).
303. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 315.365 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 352.150 (1966).
304. E.g., HAWAII R.Ev. STAT. § 417-57 (1968).
305. E.g., MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 42 (rev. ed. 1964).
306• .ALAs. STAT. ANN. §§ 10.20.005-.725 (1968); .ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-1901 to -1921
(1966) (highly modified version); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1001 to -1099(1) (1967), as
amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1002, -1055, -1094 (Supp. 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 291030(a) (Supp. V 1972); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2101 to -3601 (1970) (modified version);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 23-7-1.1-1 to .1-66 (1972); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 504A.l-.101 (Supp.
1972); KY. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.161-.390 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 355.010-.520
(1966), as amended, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 355.025 (Supp. 1973); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN.
§§ 15-2301 to -2397 (1967), as amended, MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2354, -2359,
-2383 to 84 (Supp. 1971); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 21-1901 to -19, 106 (1970); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 10-24-01 to -24-28 (1960), as amended, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-24-05, -24-23 (Supp.
1973); ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 61.005-.950 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-101 to -2007 (Supp.
1972) (sections of MNPCA scattered throughout these sections); TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (1962), as amended, TEX. R.Ev. Cxv. STAT. arts. 1396-2.06,
-2.14, -2.17, -2.18, -2.27, -3.02, -7.01, -7.02, -7.12, -8.08, -9.02 (Supp. 1972); UTAH CoDE
ANN. §§ 16-6-18 to -6-53 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2301-806 (1973); WASH. R.Ev.
CODE ANN. §§ 24.03.005-.925 (Supp. 1972); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.01-.76 (1957), as
amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.04, .15, .175, .37, .56, .68, .76 (Supp. 1973). Illinois'
General Not for Profit Corporation Act, ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 163a-163al00 (1972),
although older, is quite similar to the MNPCA.
307. Ar.As. STAT. §§ 10.40.010-.120 (1968); D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516, -601 to
-606 (1967), as amended, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -516 (Supp. 1972); GA. CoDE .ANN.
§§ 22-5501 to -5512 (1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 504.1-.29 (1949), as amended, IOWA

August 1973]

Religious Corporations and the Law

1555

The MNPCA provides basically for a membership form of corporation.308 It allows for the incorporation of any level of ecclesiastical organization, be it a congregation, a national denomination, or
some level of the hierarchy of a given denomination.309 It should be
remembered that the MNPCA applies also to all other forms of nonprofit corporations, as well as to the religious or ecclesiastical corporation.
The formation of a corporation under the MNPCA is similar to
the formation of a corporation under the Model Business Corporation Act, which has been described previously.310
A corporation is given more powers under the MNPCA than under most state ecclesiastical corporation laws. Under section five of
the Act the following powers are granted to the corporation: to have
perpetual succession; to sue; to have a corporate seal; to purchase,
hold, lease, take by gift, or improve real and personal property or
any interest therein, wherever situated; to sell, convey, mortgage,
pledge, lease, or otherwise encumber its property; to lend to employees other than directors or officers; to deal in securities or obligations
of any company or governmental unit in the United States; to make
contracts, borrow, issue notes or bonds, or give security; to lend for
corporate purposes, take security, and invest funds; to conduct its
affairs in any state or foreign country; to elect or appoint officers or
agents and fix their salaries; to make or alter bylaws; to make donations for public welfare or charities; to indemnify any officer for the
expenses of any suit resulting from his acting as a director of another
corporation at his own corporation's request; to cease activities and
dissolve; and to exercise all necessary and convenient powers to effect
its purposes. The power of the board of directors in exercising the
above powers is limited only by the fact that they are elected and by
a specific requirement that in order to sell or encumber all or substantially all of the corporate assets, two thirds of the membership
must give its prior approval. 311
The MNPCA provides for voluntary and involuntary dissolution
procedures. Voluntary dissolution takes place after approval by the
CODE ANN. §§ 504.1-.29 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REv. CoDFS ANN. §§ 15-2401 to -2413
(1967); ORE. REv. STAT. § 61.055 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -11 (1973); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 701-06 (1967); WASH, R.Ev. CODE ANN. §§ 24.12.010-.40 (1972);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01-.17 (1957), as amended, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 187.01-.17 (Supp.
1972).
308. It is possible, however, to form a corporation under the MNPCA without
members. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 11 (rev. ed. 1964).
309. See MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr §§ 28-31 (rev. ed. 1964).
310. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra.
311. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 44 (rev. ed. 1964).
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board of directors and two thirds of those members present and voting at a meeting properly called to consider the issue.312 Upon approval as outlined above, the corporation ceases operation and sends
notice to all creditors.313 Assets go first to creditors, then to those
contributors who specified the return of assets contributed in such an
event, then to another corporation with similar purposes if the assets
are in fact held in trust for a particular purpose, and finally to the
members or other persons entitled to their possession according to
the articles or bylaws.314 When all of the assets are distributed, the
president and secretary execute and verify articles of dissolution315
and file duplicates with the secretary of state, who files one, returns
one, and issues a certificate of dissolution. 316
Involuntary dissolution may be initiated by a member or director
when the directors are in deadlock, the members cannot break the
deadlock and irreparable injury to the corporation is suffered or
threatened; when acts of the directors are illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent; or when assets are being misapplied or wasted. 317 A
creditor may initiate a suit for dissolution if (1) he has a claim reduced to judgment, a return nulla bona has been made, and the
corporation is insolvent, or (2) the corporation admits to his claim
in writing and is shmvn to be insolvent.318 Such dissolution is accomplished by filing a suit in a court of equity. The court then appoints a liquidating receiver319 with the power to distribute assets
in the order described previously.320 When all the assets are distributed, the court issues a decree of dissolution,821 which must be filed
with the secretary of state.322
A corporation organized under the MNPCA may merge or consolidate with one or more other domestic corporations.323 An alternative section of the MNPCA allows merger or consolidation with foreign nonprofit corporations.324 The MNPCA follows the pattern
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
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MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
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Acr
Acr
Acr
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Acr
Acr
Acr
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45 (rev. ed. 1964).

§ 45 (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 46 (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 49 (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 50 (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 54(a) (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 54(b) (rev. ed. 1964).

§ 55 (rev. ed. 1964).
§ 55 (rev. ed. 1964).

59 (rev. ed.
60 (rev. ed.
§§ 38-39 (rev.
§ 43 (rev. ed.
§

§

1964).
1964).
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prevalent in the United States in requiring a plan of merger or consolidation to be adopted first by the board of directors and then by
two thirds of those present and voting at a meeting properly called
to consider the issue.325 Articles of merger must be adopted and duplicates filed with the secretary of state, who then files one, returns one,
and issues a certificate of merger.326 The new corporation so formed
succeeds to all rights and liabilities of the predecessor corporations.327
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AsPECTS OF RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS

The problems relating to incorporation of religious societies have
had a long history in this country. The major developments in this
history occurred prior to the United States Supreme Court's extensive and highly significant interpretations of the religion clauses of
the first amendment, which have been extended to the states via the
fourteenth amendment.328 Although matters concerning the powers
and limitations of ecclesiastical corporations, as well as questions
about the intervention of civil courts in the internal affairs of
churches, have traditionally been handled by state courts on the basis
of statutes and state case law,329 the imposing body of recent decisions
on the meaning and application of the first amendment330 warrant a
closer look at some constitutional aspects of the church corporation
problem.
The initial and basic question is whether a state grant of the
corporate privilege to societies organized for a religious purpose is
consistent with the proscriptions of the establishment clause of the
first amendment.831 While it may appear highly academic or perhaps
325. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 40(a) (rev. ed. 1964).
326. MODEL NON-PROFIT CoRPORATION Acr § 41 (rev. ed. 1964).
327. MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION Acr § 42 (rev. ed. 1964).
328. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
329. E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). See note
49 supra and accompanying text.
330. See, inter alia, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 1318 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commn.,
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
331. In Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 48-49 (1815), Justice Story delivered
perhaps the only direct Supreme Court remark on the subject:
It is conceded on all sides that, at the revolution, the Episcopal church no
longer retained its character as an exclusive religious establishment. And there
can be no doubt that it was competent to the people and to the legislature to
deprive it of its superiority over other religious sects, and to withhold from it any
support by public taxation. But, although it may be true that "religion can be
directed only by reason and conviction, not by force and violence," and that "all
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates
of conscience," as the bill of rights of Virginia declares, yet it is difficult to per-

1558

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71:1499

even frivolous to raise this issue today, there is some precedent that
may suggest the importance of the question. In the famous case of
Everson v. Board of Education 332 the Supreme Court stated that the
establishment clause was designed to prohibit any form of aid to any
and all religions and to ordain the separation of church and state.
If the no-aid language is literally construed, a formidable case can
be made against the validity of any statute that grants to religious
bodies a legal device that is immensely useful, not only in carrying
on routine business, but also in acquiring and accumulating property. The same can be said of the application of the charitable trust
doctrine, whereby courts recognize and enforce trusts for the benefit
of religious societies and in aid of religious purposes. The great value
to churches of these benefits secured by law is readily apparent. Perhaps it is safe to say that the recognition of the power of religious
groups to acquire and own property and enter into contracts, to be
the beneficiaries of charitable trusts, and to enjoy the protection afforded by the laws of the state in carrying out their religious functions are among the chief forms of aid given by the state to religious
societies.
The argument that the no-aid interpretation requires the invalidation of laws permitting the incorporation of religious societies derives some force from President Madison's veto of a bill to incorporate
the Episcopal Church for the District of Columbia.333 He said that
ceive how it follows as a consequence that the legislature may not enact laws
more effectually to enable all sects to accomplish the great objects of religion by giving them corporate rights for the management of their property, and the regulation of their temporal as well as spiritual concerns. Consistent with the Constitution
of Virginia the legislature could not create or continue a religious establishment
which should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to
worship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose
creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the free exercise of religion
cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by aiding with equal attention the
votaries of every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishing
funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of
churches, or for the sepulture of the dead. And that these purposes could be better
secured and cherished by corporate powers, cannot be doubted by any person
who has attended to the difficulties which surround all voluntary associations,
While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens from a compulsive
attendance and payment of taxes in support of any particular sect, it is not perceived that either public or constitutional principles required the abolition of all
religious corporations.
332. 330 U.S. I (1947).
333. The following is the complete text of his veto message:
To the House of Representatives of the United States:
Having examined and considered the bill, entitled "An Act incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia," I now return the bill to the House of Representatives, in which it originated,
with the following objections:
Because the bill exceeds the rightful authority to which Governments arc
limited, by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and
violates, in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which
declares, that "Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment."
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the bill would amount to an establishment of religion forbidden by
the first amendment. In assessing the significance of Madison's veto,
it must be remembered that this corporation was chartered by special
law and that the incorporation of only one church was subject to the
charge that it was unduly preferred over others.834 Also, the grant of
corporate status could well be viewed as an attempt to restore some
special privileges lost when the Episcopal Church was disestablished
in Virginia and Maryland.335 Moreover, as stressed by Madison in
his veto message, the bill, by adopting the rules for the governance
of the Episcopal Church, intruded into religious matters, since it
gave a legal sanction to matters reserved for the determination of the
church and would prevent the church from making changes in its
internal law. Madison regarded this as an establishment of religion.
In confining his criticism to features of this special charter, Madison
did not necessarily take the view that a general law that permitted the
incorporation of churches and did not attempt to prescribe the organizations' internal law would be unconstitutional. But the fact that
Virginia, strongly influenced by Madison in these matters, adopted
a constitutional provision prohibiting the incorporation of societies
for religious purposes336 strongly suggests that Madison feared that
the incorporation of churches would be a means for the enlargement
The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative
purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated, and comprehending even the election and removal of the Minister of the same; so that no
change could be made therein by the particular society, or by the general church
of which it is a member, and whose authority it recognises. This particular church,
therefore, would so far be a religious establishment by law; a legal force and
sanction being given to certain articles in its constitution and administration. Nor
can it be considered, that the articles thus established are to be taken as the
descriptive criteria only of the corporate identity of the society, inasmuch as this
identity must depend on other characteristics; as the regulations established are
generally unessential, and alterable according to the principles and canons, by
which churches of that denomination govern themselves; and as the injunctions
and prohibitions contained in the regulations, would be enforced by the penal
consequences applicable to a violation of them according to the local law:
Because the bill vests in the said incorporated church an authority to provide
for the support of the poor, and the education of poor children of the same; an
authority which being altogether superfluous, if the provision is to be the result
of pious charity, would be a precedent for giving to religious societies, as such,
a legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty.
24 ANNALS OF CONG. 982-83 (1853) [11th Cong., 3d Sess. (1810-11)]. The text is also
reproduced in M. HOWE, CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 85 (1952).
334. See the Presbyterian Protest Against Incorporation of Churches, which was
directed against the bill in the Virginia legislature that would have authorized the
incorporation of Protestant Episcopal churches in each parish. The protest is reproduced in M. HowE, supra note 333, at 13-14.
335. For a history of the early Virginia statutes relating to establishment, disestablhhmcnt, and incorporation of churches, sec Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43
(1815).
336. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14. See text accompanying notes 139-72 supra.
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of ecclesiastical power and would lead to abuse, including ecclesiastical intervention in matters of state.337
Despite Madison's view, the whole history of religious corporations, culminating in contemporary statutes that permit the easy
incorporation of religious societies, supports the power of the state
to grant the corporate privilege for religious purposes. That is, the
argument can be made in the context of corporation laws, as was
made in the Walz case338-where the Court relied in substantial part
on history to sustain state property tax exemptions for property held
for religious purposes-that the constitutionality of these laws is upheld by the fact that they have existed for so long. This viewpoint accords with Justice Holmes' aphorism that a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.339
But reliance need not be placed solely or primarily on the historical argument to support the incorporation of church bodies. In the
first place, the no-aid proscription has not been taken literally by
, the Supreme Court. Instead, the Constitution has been interpreted
to prohibit those forms of assistance that are distinctively in aid of
religious purposes and are not required in the interest of guaranteeing religious liberty.340 A complementary proposition is that the establishment clause does not prohibit laws or programs that are directed
to appropriate secular ends, even though such laws or programs result
in incidental aid to religion. 341
The secular-purpose approach was given definitive approval in
School District v. Schempp,342 where the Court said that the relevant
tests in determining whether a given governmental enactment runs
afoul of the establishment clause are: (1) Does the enactment have a
secular legislative purpose, and (2) does it have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion? 343 Statutes that allow churches
337. For a sampling of the general views of Jefferson and Madison on the subject,
see CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 142, at 68-87.
338. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
339. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
340. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 41 U.S.L.W. 5153
(U.S., June 25, 1973) (public aid to parochial schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) (public aid to parochial schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayers
in public schools); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in public schools).
341. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (capital grants to church-related
colleges); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free textbooks for parochial
school students); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (bus transportation of children to parochial
schools).
342. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
343. 374 U.S. at 222.
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to incorporate meet this test easily. These statutes are clearly directed
to secular ends-to facilitate the carrying on of business, entering into
contracts, and acquiring and disposing of property. Their primary
effect can also be measured by these secular considerations. The state
is not prescribing a faith, sanctioning religious acts or programs, or
giving its support to religious teaching when it authorizes a group
to form a religious corporation any more than the state is supporting
a private business when it grants a corporate charter to a commercial
group. This was clearly recognized in Bradfield v. Roberts,344 one of
the few early cases arising under the establishment clause. In upholding the constitutionality of congressional grants to a District of Columbia hospital that was mvned and operated by a sisterhood of the
Roman Catholic Church, the Court said that the corporation that
controlled the hospital was itself nonsectarian and "simply . . . a
secular corporation being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are
managing the corporation according to the law under which it
exists. " 345
The secular-purpose requirement brings to the fore a view frequently voiced by state courts346 in characterizing and dealing with
religious corporations: An incorporated religious society is viewed
as a dual entity.347 It is, first and primarily, a religious association
dedicated to spiritual ends, with its own internal authority concerning religious matters. As a corporation, it is a secular entity, operating under state auspices and subject to the general laws of the state
respecting corporate procedure and contractual and proprietary matters. In short, a religious society is seen as serving both religious and
secular purposes, and the incorporation privilege is directed to the
secular aspects of its operation.
The Supreme Court has also stressed neutrality as a primary consideration in interpreting the establishment clause. 348 Carried to its
logical conclusion, this means that regulating laws of general application must apply equally to churches and religious activities and,
conversely, that churches may not be denied privileges granted to
other groups under general laws. Obviously, state laws that grant
the corporate privilege to all nonprofit corporations meet the neutral344. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
345. 175 U.S. at 298-99.
346. See, e.g., Gray v. Good, 44 Ind. App. 476, 89 N.E. 798 (1909); Miller v. Trustees
of Baptist Church &: Congregation, 16 N.J.L 251 (1837).
347. See C. ZOLLMAN, supra note 6, at 117-18.
348. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-27 (1963).
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ity test so far as their use by religious societies is concerned. Under
such general laws the religious factor is not a relevant consideration;
the nonprofit element is the key classification factor.
The arguments with respect to neutrality lose some of their persuasive force when churches do not derive their corporate privilege
from general incorporation laws embracing all nonprofit organizations. For instance, the incorporation of churches may take place
under statutes that are designed peculiarly for ecclesiastical or religious societies, although they do not single out any one denomination
for special treatment. 349 The classification in such statutes is in terms
of societies organized for religious purposes. This type of law on its
face is not neutral. It is fair, however, to assume that any state that
permits the incorporation of societies organized for religious purposes
also permits the incorporation of other nonprofit societies. Thus, the
religious corporation laws may be viewed in th~ context of other state
laws having to do with nonprofit associations,just as a law granting
tax exemptions for property held for religious purposes may be a
part of a general statutory scheme for exempting property used by
nonprofit organizations.850
More difficulty is encountered in a state like New York, which has,
over the years, enacted a series of separate incorporation statutes that
are tailored to the needs of particular churches.851 These individual
statutes are, in a sense, special statutes, since they deal with the incorporation of churches of a designated denomination. Furthermore,
they offer the opportunity of granting preferential treatment to some
churches at the expense of others and thereby of violating the concept
of neutrality. This way of dealing with the problem is supported by
historical considerations. It may be viewed as a survival of earlier
days when the state dealt specially with an established church and
also as a carryover from the earlier era when the corporate privilege
349. E.g., CoLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20-1 to -14 (1963); lDAHo CODE §§ 30-II0I to
-III0 (1967); ME. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2861-3161 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.01.50 (1969), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 351.01-.50 (Supp. 1973).
350. In Walz, the Court noted that New York had "not singled out one particular

church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it [had] granted exemption
to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit,
quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific,
professional, historical, and patriotic groups." 397 U.S. at 673.
351. See N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP. I.Aw (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. R.ELIG. CORP,
I.Aw (Supp. 1972). The following is an example of the kinds of problems that can
arise: Where a state statute specifies a given voting age for a religious corporation
and the religious corporation's bylaws allow those of a lesser age to vote, a question is
raised as to the legal effectiveness of decisions made when the underaged voters participate. This problem could become critical when the matter being dealt with concerns
purely secular matters such as the sale or mortgage of real property.
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was granted only by special charter. Once a state gets into the practice of providing a separate corporation law for a particular church
that is influential enough in the legislature to secure an enactment
of this kind of law, the legislature probably finds it difficult to escape
from it. It may be that the historical considerations are in themselves
adequate to support this legislation. Leaving the historical consideration aside, however, the most important consideration is whether
the practical effect of these laws is to prefer some churches at the
expense of others. In New York it appears from an examination of
the individual statutes that any church body seriously interested in
securing the corporate privilege has no difficulty in obtaining it.
Moreover, in New York, general statutes permit the incorporation
of religious bodies, so that churches not specifically provided for by
the hand-tailored statutes may nevertheless incorporate under a general statute. 302 Indeed, it may be argued that churches organized
under the general incorporation law stand in a better position than
those for which special statutes have been enacted because the general laws allow churches much more freedom and flexibility in defining their internal procedures and practices.353Since the special
denominational type of law is designed to provide a corporate scaffolding for the particular ecclesiastical structure, it thereby gives a
legal support to the church's own internal laws. The important question this kind of statute raises is not whether it is unduly preferential or discriminatory, but whether, in its practical operation, it
unduly restricts the freedom of the churches and therefore violates
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. More attention will
be given to this question Iater.354
Finally, it may be argued that the state may appropriately implement religious liberty by authorizing the use of legal means that
enable churches better to achieve their purposes. Entering into contracts and acquiring and holding at least some property, activities
that are essential to carrying out religious functions, are greatly
352. N.Y. RELIG, CORP, I.Aw§§ 3-27 {McKinney 1952).
353. For example, the Maryland statutes governing the Protestant Episcopal Church
and its dioceses in the state of Maryland extensively regulate various aspects of internal procedure. For a sample list of those items regulated, see note 373 infra. However, in a state such as Washington, which utilizes the MNPCA, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 24.03.005-.925 (Supp. 1972), very little internal regulation is set forth. Methods
are provided for removing officers, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 24.03.130 (Supp. 1972),
limiting the sale of all or substantially all of the corporate property, WASH. REv. CODE
ANN.§ 24.03.215 (Supp. 1972), allowing merger or consolidation, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 24.03.195 (Supp. 1972), and dissolution, WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 24.03.235-.302 (Supp.
1972).
354. See text accompanying notes 364-74 infra.
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facilitated by the use of the corporate privilege. The privilege thus
becomes a means of promoting the exercise of religious liberty b'y
collective entities and is a phase of what Chief Justice Burger has
called "benevolent neutrality."355 Indeed, the resemblance and the
parallels between the arguments in support of the validity of incorporation laws and in support of the validity of tax exemption laws
are striking.
The discussion up to this point has centered on the question of
whether the grant of the corporate privilege to a religious society
violates the establishment clause. Other constitutional considerations
are suggested under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Since the use of the corporate device as a means of acquiring, holding,
and disposing of property and doing business is now considered virtually indispensible to the functioning of any kind of organized
group, it is arguable that the church may claim the privilege of incorporation as a matter of constitutional right in the name of religious
liberty. This claim, if valid, jeopardizes the Virginia856 and West
Virginia357 constitutional provisions, which prohibit the incorporation of churches.
It may seriously be doubted, however, whether the free exercise
argument, stated in this abstract form, would have much persuasive
force with the Supreme Court. Considerations of the importance of
the corporate form may be sufficient to sustain legislative authorization of the incorporation of churches, but not compelling enough to
create a right of incorporation. The idea is now so well established
in American law that the corporate privilege is a special grant from
the legislature, made only at its discretion,358 that any claim of a
constitutional right of incorporation, whether made by religious or
by secular entities, would hardly receive serious attention. But, again,
this question is largely academic. Even if religious societies have no
constitutional right to incorporate, the claim can be made that they
have a right under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the
corporate privilege. Perhaps the state is free to withhold the corporate privilege from all nonprofit societies, but if it grants the privilege
generally, it should not be free to deny the privilege on religious
grounds. Such discrimination offends either the equal protection
355. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). See quotation from Justice
Story in note 331 supra.
356. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
357. w. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 47.
358. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORl'ORATIONS § 12, at 18 (1970).
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clause or the free exercise clause or the two in combination and is
clearly incompatible with the neutrality concept.359
While the Virginia and West Virginia prohibitions on religious
corporations are subject to attack on the ground of discrimination,
the question may be raised whether the practical effect of the operation of the laws in these two states is to hamper the churches in a
substantial way in carrying on their secular enterprises. As previously
noted, 360 in both these two states, legislation permits the acquisition
of property for religious purposes in the name of trustees, and the
benefit of the charitable trust doctrine has been extended by statute
to trusts for religious purposes. While, therefore, the handling of
commercial and property transactions in Virginia by churches may
not be as conveniently done as in other states where the full corporate privilege is enjoyed, it is not clear that churches in Virginia have
suffered seriously from this restriction. It is of interest, however, that
at the time revision of the Virginia constitution was proposed, the
argument was made that this provision should be deleted from the
Virginia constitution on the ground of its possible conflict with rights
secured under the religion clauses of the first amendment.361
More concrete free exercise questions may be raised by incorporation laws that restrict rather than enhance the freedom of churches.
Mention may be made first of state legislation that restricts the total
amount of real estate that may be mvned by religious corporations.362
There is no evidence to indicate that these restrictions have imposed
a substantial burden on churches or have seriously restricted them in
359. See the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court in In re Proposal C, 384
Mich. 390, 432-33, 185 N.W.2d 9, 28-29 (1971), where the court relied on both equal
protection and free exercise grounds in declaring invalid a Michigan constitutional
provision that excluded private school children, including those attending parochial
schools, from receiving shared time instruction or auxiliary services at public schools.
"Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis ••••
In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation
encircles a claim so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions
could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter." Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S.
664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
For development of the thesis that the twin religion clauses of the first amendment
forbid the use of the religious factor as the basis for a classification for purposes of
governmental action, see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
360. See text accompanying notes 139-72 supra.
361. The 1969 report of the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Revision stated:
"[The section banning incorporation of churches] singles out the religious bodies for
exclusion from the benefits of a general law to which other bodies are entitled. By so
discriminating against churches the present section is probably unconstitutional under
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution." CoMMN. ON CoNsrrrUTIONAL REVISION, REPORT ON THE CONsrITUTION OF VIRGINIA 125 (1969). The Commission recommended the deletion of the provision, but the new Virginia constitution, effective
July 1, 1971, retains the provision. VA. CoNST. art. IV, § 14.
362. See statutes listed in note 242 supra.
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the exercise of their religious functions. But whether these restrictive
provisions are valid is another question. The first inquiry should be
whether such laws are aimed peculiarly at religious societies.
If, for instance, a limitation of this nature were part of the general laws applicable to all corporations or at least to all nonprofit
corporations, it may seriously be doubted that the validity of the
restrictions could be challenged. On the other hand, if the limitation
is directed peculiarly against corporations organized for religious
purposes in order to prevent a large accumulation of property by
churches, it may violate either the free exercise or the equal protection clauses. However, courts may accept the argument, based on
historical experience, that some limitations on the holding of real
property by churches is justified by the tendency of churches to accumulate property and thereby to acquire power that may be deemed
inimical to the public interests. In terms of a familiar test, 363 the
state may be found to have a compelling interest in imposing these
restrictions. It is doubtful, however, that a state could persuasively
document its position that accumulation of property by churches presents a greater threat to the public interest than accumulation by
other corporations, both profit and nonprofit.
Perhaps even more important in considering the free exercise
clause are the restrictions that specifically tailored incorporation
laws may place on the internal freedom of churches. These statutes
may set forth very detailed procedures to be followed in nmning the
affairs of the church. For instance, the New York statute that provides
for the incorporation of the Episcopal Church specifically defines the
powers of the vestry and the board of wardens and the procedure to
be followed at meetings of the board. 364 A celebrated case revolved
around whether the statute had been duly observed with respect to
the dismissal of a rector. 365 In some states provision is made that only
persons of legal age shall take part in the corporate meetings.866
This is proving to be a particularly troublesome provision at present
in view of the tendency to reduce the legal age, and in some cases
363. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
364. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW §§ 40-49 (McKinney 1952), as amended, N.Y. REuG.
CORP. LAw §§ 40-49 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
365. Rector, Church Wardens &: Vestrymen of the Church of the Holy Trinity v.
Melish, 301 N.Y. 679 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 936 (1951). This case was in and out
of the New York courts from 1949 to 1958. The rector was dismissed due to alleged
pro-Communist leanings. His successor was duly appointed by the bishop responsible
and was required to secure a court order directing the sheriff to expel the dismissed
rector from the vestry. The dismissed rector's son, however, was granted a stay of
the order since he had not been a party to the original action. Application of Melish,
6 App. Div. 2d 819, 176 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1958). The record is silent beyond this point.
366. See note 269 supra and accompanying text.
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churches have acted to reduce the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen before the civil law has been modified. If a church in its own
constitution and bylaws regulating its affairs as a religious society
provides that eighteen-year-olds have a vote in all matters coming
before the group, whereas the statute under which the church is incorporated permits voting to be done on matters properly coming
before the corporate group only by persons of at least nventy-one
years of age, may the church go ahead and do its business by reference to its own internal law and disregard the limitations imposed
by the law under which it is incorporated?
Any discussion of state involvement in a church's internal affairs
brings up the dual capacities in which church corporations or church
societies operate. With respect to the handling of business matters
and the acquisition and disposition of property, church bodies are
conducting secular affairs and are appropriately subject to the laws
of the state. But with respect to their own spiritual affairs, such as
the admission or expulsion of members, the election or dismissal of
a minister, and questions of doctrine, ecclesiastical organizations
continue to be viewed as unincorporated associations and are free
to make their own decisions without interference by the state.367
Matters distinctively spiritual or ecclesiastical relate to such issues as
the admission or expulsion of members, the election or dismissal of
a minister, and matters of doctrine. Obviously, this secular-spiritual
dichotomy is of importance in connection with the questions we are
discussing here. If the granting and exercise of the corporate privilege
and the doing of business with regard to property matters is considered an aspect of the secular enterprise of the church, then church
corporations, like other corporations, are subject to the state's usual
laws respecting contract, property, and association law and must be
expected to conform to it. It is not supposed that the churches do
not have to conform with the property laws respecting the registration of deeds, the signatures required for a valid deed, and restrictions
on the use of property or that a church is immune to the rules respecting contractual liability. Nor is it seriously argued that churches
are immune to the general laws respecting the principles of agency
in determining who is authorized to make contracts for a church. If
this is the case, the question may seriously be raised whether churches
may claim immunity to provisions of association law that affect the
churches in carrying on their secular activities.
Unfortunately, the spiritual-secular distinction, while an acceptable abstract proposition, does not always admit of easy application.
367. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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A matter that may seem secular to the civil authorities may have important religious significance to ecclesiastical authorities.368 For instance, a church may well assert that the age at which members may
participate in its meetings, when and how its meetings are conducted,
and what procedures are used in calling and dismissing its ministers
are internal affairs of central concern to its operation as a religious
enterprise. The state may be intruding too significantly into the
affairs of a church when it regulates these matters under its corporation laws.369
A further consideration relevant to the spiritual-secular dichotomy is found in the doctrine of excessive entanglements, recently
developed by the Supreme Court as a test in the interpretation of the
establishment clause.370 The Court found that one purpose of the
establishment clause is to avoid intrusion by civil authorities into
religious affairs. Government may not engage in programs or enact
laws that require extensive surveillance by civil authorities of the
activities of religious institutions, since such surveillance entails the
risk of entangling the state in matters of religious significance. The
excessive entanglements idea at least suggests that the state may run
afoul of the first amendment if it attempts to regulate internal church
matters that have a significant religious aspect and may properly be
regarded as falling within the sphere of the church's autonomy.
While it may be argued that the religious society, having elected
to avail itself of the corporate privilege, has consented to be governed
by the conditions and restrictions imposed by the law, this argument
does not answer questions raised by the excessive entanglements issue.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is now too well devel368. This situation has been causing some perplexity among courts faced with the
problem. For example, in Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. App. 1972),
the court was faced with a property dispute involving a congregation of the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church. The court, in the course of its opinion stated:
This causes us to consider what is religious doctrine and practice..•.
The religious rites, doctrines, polity and practices of a church certainly contain
as an essential part beliefs and practices in regard to the ownership of property.
These beliefs are primarily religious and not secular. Frequently these beliefs are
as strongly held as religious beliefs in regard to baptism or the sacraments. In
other words, beliefs as to the proper method for a church to own property are
frequently bound up with and intermingled in the religious rites, doctrines, polity
and practices of the church.
280 N.E.2d at 78-79 (emphasis original).
369. President James Madison, in vetoing the bill to incorporate the Episcopal
Church for the District of Columbia on the ground that it violated the establishment
clause, relied primarily on the argument that the statute, by regulating matters internal to the church, intruded on ecclesiastical matters and gave a legal sanction to
ecclesiastical law. See note 333 supra.
370. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970): "[I]he questions [in deciding
whether to tax churches or grant exemptions] are whether the involvement is excessive,
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement."
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oped to suggest that a state may condition a privilege in any manner
it sees fit. 871 Presumably a religious body may continue to exercise its
general privileges to carry on business under a statute permitting its
incorporation even though it challenges the validity of some statutory
restrictions on the ground of undue interference in internal matters. a12
The consent argument may have some validity, however, in the
case of special incorporation statutes that, like those in New York, are
tailored to meet the needs of a given denomination. It should be
emphasized that statutes of this kind, enacted at the request of the
body, are designed to secure a conformity of the civil law to the
church's internal law. The state has accommodated its laws to the
needs of a give:tJ. denomination and, in a very real sense, has used its
authority to implement the freedom of the churches to fashion their
own ecclesiastical law. It would seem that the problems most likely to
arise will result from the failure to amend the statute to conform to
changes in the church's own internal law.873 If a church is restricted
by the provisions in a specifically tailored statute, perhaps it should
seek amendment of the statute rather than attempt to repudiate a
part of it on constitutional grounds. If the state has a general religious
corporation law, it may be possible for the church to reincorporate
under the general law; this could prove beneficial due to the greater
freedom on internal matters that such laws generally allow.874
Finally, attention may be directed to problems that may result
from the intervention by civil organs in the internal affairs of a
371. The doctrine is that a state may not condition a benefit on the waiver of a
constitutional right. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
HARV. L REV. 1439 (1968). For earlier discussion, see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 Coum:. L. REV. 321 (1935); Merritt, Unconstitutio11al Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879 (1929).
372. See First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958), and
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), where the Court held that churches could
continue to enjoy statutory tax exemptions despite failure to observe restrictions that
the Court found to be unconstitutional.
373. See generally Casad, supra note 49. An excellent example of the type of extensive regulation that this type of statute may impose can be found in Maryland. In
Maryland, each diocese of the Episcopal Church has its own statute of incorporationc.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 274A-97 (Diocese of Maryland), 298-312 (Diocese of
Eaton), 312A-Q (Diocese of Washington) (1973). These acts vary among the dioceses as
to matters of internal regulation, but do regulate, among other things, such procedural matters as the age of those eligible to vote for the vestry, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§§ 275 (Maryland, 18), 299 (Eaton, 21), 312A (Washington, 18) (1973), the number of
vestr}men and the date of the annual congregational meeting, MD. ANN. CoDE art.
23, § 301 (1973), powers and duties of the vestry, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 304 (1973),
powers, duties and obligations of the rector, MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 305 (1973), and
powers and duties of the registrar, MD. ANN. CoDE art. 23, § 306 (1973).
374. See note 353 supra and accompanying text.
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religious society. Before further discussion, attention should be called
to the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church.815 The Court held that the Georgia courts had
violated the religion clauses of the first amendment by upholding
the freedom of a local Presbyterian congregation to secede from the
national church body and to take its property with it.376 The Georgia
courts had used the traditional departure-from-fundamental-doctrine
rule to settle the dispute. According to this rule, property contributed
to a religious body by its members was impressed with a trust in favor
of the fundamental doctrines of that body. If a dispute arose over the
control of this property, civil courts were allowed to determine which
faction had been faithful to the trust.377 The Supreme Court held
that the rule was unconstitutional because it required a state court
to intrude into distinctively ecclesiastical matters-first, by determining the fundamental doctrines of the church and, second, by inquiring
whether there had been a substantial departure from such doctrines.378
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, said that
questions concerning church ownership, use, and control of property
were appropriate for determination by the civil courts and might
necessarily involve the application of doctrine if a dispute were due
to an internal schism over control of church property. The doctrinal
matter should, however, be left to determination by the authoritative
organs established by the denomination, subject to possible judicial
review for collusion or fraud. 379 This approach requires a determina375. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
376. 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
377. See Note, 75 HAR.v. L. REv. 1142, supra note 49; Note, 74 YALE
note 49.
378. The Court stated:

LJ.

1118, supra

The departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory which they (the
Georgia courts] applied requires the civil judiciary to determine whether actions
of the general church constitute such a "substantial departure" from the tenets of
faith and practice existing at the time of the local churches' affiliation that the
trust in favor of the general church must be declared to have terminated. This
determination has two parts. The civil court must first decide whether the challenged actions of the general church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In
reaching such a decision, the court must of necessity make its own interpretation
of the meaning of church doctrines. If the court should decide that a substantial
departure has occurred, it must then go on to determine whether the issue on
which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the
traditional theology as to require that the trust be terminated. A civil court can
make this determination only after assessing the relative significance to the religion
of the tenets from which departure was found. Thus, the departure-from-doctrine
element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine
matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of these doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First
Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role.
393 U.S. at 449-50.
379. 393 U.S. at 446-47. The Court stated that "civil courts [have] no role in deter-
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tion of the locus of ultimate authority, as fixed by church law. But
the Court said that the matter could also be properly determined
by the application of neutral principles.380 Presumably, the Court
had in mind general principles derived from contract, property, or
trust law or rules derived from the laws of a state relating to corporations and nonprofit associations. 381 In a separate opinion accompanying a later per curiam decision,382 Mr. Justice Brennan indicated that
even the resort to church polity to resolve such disputes might also
be illegal, since the inquiry into polity could itself be deemed to be
an inquiry into an ecclesiastical matter.
Admittedly, Presbyterian Church raises a number of difficult questions, as evidenced by the confusion in subsequent state court decisions.383 No attempt is made in this Article to explore such difficult
mining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes," but that
"there might be some circumstances in which marginal civil court review of ecclesiastical determinations would be appropriate." 393 U.S. at 447 (emphasis original). It then
quoted from Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. I, 16 (1929), as follows: "In the absence
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation
before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so
by contract or otherwise." 393 U.S. at 447. This language, said the Court, 393 U.S. at
447, was converted to a constitutional rule by Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
380. "Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their
doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without establishing
churches to which property is awarded." 393 U.S. at 449.
381. See Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970),
concurring in the majority's per curiam dismissal of the appeal in this case.
Justice Harlan, in his short concurring opinion in Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969), indicated
that nothing in the Court's opinion would preclude a state court's using familiar
trust principles, including reversion of the property to the donor in case of failure
to observe the conditions of the grant, in dealing with church property.
Interestingly, the Georgia court, on remand of the Presbyterian Church case, interpreted language in the Court's opinion to mean that Georgia could no longer enforce
any aspect of its implied trust doctrine with respect to property owned by a Presbyterian congregation. Accordingly, it held that since title had been taken in the name
of the congregation, the congregation would prevail. Presbyterian Church in the
United States v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970). Two other state courts, Wyche v. Alexander,
15 N.C. App. 130, 189 S.E.2d 608 (1972); Presbytery v. Rohrbauer, 79 Wash. 2d 367, 485
P.2d 615 (1971), have since interpreted the Court's language differently.
382. Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970). Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion
by Justices Marshall and Douglas.
383. The lower courts have used some widely disparate rules in handling church
property disputes since the Presbyterian Church case. For example, in Nolynn Assn. of
Separate Baptists in Christ v. Oak Grove Separate Baptist Church, 457 S.W.2d 633
(Ky. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971), the Kentucky supreme court held that it
was proper to seek to identify the polity of the church involved in litigation and to
resolve property disputes accordingly. In Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal
dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970), the Maryland court ignored polity and simply viewed
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questions as whether church polity continues to be controlling, or
even relevant, or whether there is room for continued application
of an implied trust doctrine guided by conceptions of polity.384 The
emphasis here is on the significance of the statutory provisions that
may be invoked as neutral principles in the determination of these
controversies. The statute under which a congregation is incorporated
may prove to be decisive in a dispute involving questions of doctrine.
For instance, in a recent case the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the statute under which the local congregation had been incorporated385 did not provide for any subjection of the congregation to
the discipline and authority of a higher church body.386 The statute
did not explicitly recognize the polity doctrine and on its face gave
control of the property to the congregational corporation. The Maryland court saw the statute as a neutral principle of corporation law.887
By a combination of what might be called the "formal title" doctrine388 and the positive statutory provision, the court decided the
case without reference to the internal law of the denomination or
to the implied trust doctrine.
Whether the Maryland court made the correct choice of the applicable neutral principle is not the important question for our
purposes; what is important is that the statµte played the decisive part.
This suggests that an incorporation statute that explicitly subjects
congregations that organize under it to the polity and discipline of a
how title was actually held with respect to the local congregational property in question. Accord, Smith v. Church of God, 326 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mo. 1971); Presbyterian
Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 104 (1970); Polen v.
Cox, 259 Md. 25, 267 A.2d 201 (1970). Other courts view the implied trust doctrine as
a permissible approach to the resolution of church property disputes, since they find
it to be a "neutral principal of law." United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing
Independent Methodist Church, 276 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971); Macedono-Bulgarian
Orthodox Church "St. Clement Ohridski" v. Macedonian Patriotic Organization "Fatherland," 27 Mich. App. 713, 184 N.W.2d 233 (1970).
384. For commentary on the Presbyterian Church case, see Casad, Church Property
Litigation: A Comment on the Hull Church Case, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 44 (1970);
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case,
1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 347; Note, Hull Memorial: A Limited Solution to the Problem of
Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes, 18 KAN. L. REv. 71 (1969); Note,
Limitations on the Power of Courts in Resolving Church Property Disputes, 36 TENN.
L. REv. 549 (1969).
385. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 256-70 (1973).
386. Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
387. "The Maryland Religious Corporation Law is a general law for all religious
corporations and has no reference whatever to doctrine. It, therefore, meets the requirement of a 'neutral principle of law.' " Maryland &: Va. Eldership of The Churches
of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 254 Md. 162, 168, 254 A. 162, 166 (1969),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (emphasis original).
388. Under this doctrine the titleholder of the property has the right to determine
use of the property with neither theology nor administrative church law as relevant
considerations. See generally Casenote, 54 IOWA L. REv. 899, 907 (1969).

August 1973]

Religious Corporations and the Law

1573

denominational body would be recognized as a valid and controlling
neutral principle that would not require a court to enter into consideration of doctrinal matters. On the other hand, if the statute
under which a church is incorporated makes no explicit mention of
subjection of the local church to the discipline or authority of the
church hierarchy, the resolution of a dispute between a local congregation and a national church organization is not so clearly indicated.
The statute can be construed to set forth a neutral principle, namely,
that if the congregation is given authority to acquire, own and dispose
of property, then, so far as the civil courts are concerned, the disposition of the property rests in the corporation according to procedures
defined by its charter or bylaws.389 Thus, property acquired by a corporation serving a local congregation might not be subject to any
implied trust in accordance with the polity of the church. If, however,
the congregation's affiliation with a hierarchical structure is recognized in the congregation's constitution or bylaws, neutral principles
of either contract, trust, or associational law may be invoked to justify
a civil court's deference to the determination of the issue by the appropriate ecclesiastical agency specified in the law of the church.390
These considerations suggest that Presbyterian Church, by placing a
premium on neutral principles-including principles derived from
corporation statutes-may spark a new interest among national
church organizations in incorporation statutes that deal specifically
with given denominations and may thereby counter the general trend
in favor of general religious corporate statutes such as the MNPCA.
Quite clearly, a national body runs a risk if its local congregations are
incorporated under general statutes that take no account of denominational affiliations.
The foregoing discussion suggests some corresponding questions
concerning the merger of church bodies,391 particularly in the case
where a congregation may want to disaffiliate itself from one denomination and attach itself to another. Obviously, the preceding discussion will apply if the congregation is committed by statute to a given
389. For an example of the mechanics of such an approach, see Mack v. Huston,
23 Ohio Misc. 121, 256 N.E.2d 271 (C.P. 1970).
390. Thus, in the hypothetical case under consideration, it could be concluded that
the members, by their voluntary adherence to the written documents, had agreed to
recognize the hierarchical authority and the organs provided for determination of
disputes within the church. Or it could be concluded that the language in the basic
documents of the local congregation subjected property acquired by the congregation
to an implied trust governed by the polity and internal law of the church.
391. On the issue of merger, see Cadman Memorial Congregational Soc. v. Kenyon,
306 N.Y. 151 (1953), wherein a local congregation of the Congregational Christian
Church sued to enjoin the merger of that church with the Evangelical and Reformed
Church. The court of appeals of New York found that there was no harm to plaintiff
in that its congregational polity was preserved by the merger and that none of its
property rights was affected.
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polity and subject to the discipline of a given church. On the other
hand, if the statute under which a congregation is incorporated is
silent on the matter of polity and affiliation and vests the property
in the hands of the congregation, a neutral principle of corporation
law would allow the congregation to elect to affiliate with another
body and carry its property with it. A state court may still be free
to invoke an implied trust doctrine to prevent the congregation from
diverting the property from its original use. 392
Finally, questions may be raised respecting congregational dissolution, as distinguished from merger or transfer of assets to a related body. Here again, trust concepts may be involved. The property
of an unincorporated church body is usually dealt with according to
the doctrines of trust law.393 If there is a complete failure of the trust,
the dissolution of the society may result in a reversion to the grantor. 394 On the other hand, there may be an application of the cy pres
doctrine, whereby the property is turned over to a use for a similar
purpose.395 Of course, where the congregation was attached to a
denominational body, it would be quite natural to suppose that the
cy pres doctrine would be applied so as to require that the property
be held for the benefit of that body or at least subject to its control.
Some state statutes expressly provide for such disposition in the case
of certain types of churches with a congregational polity.806 In any
event, it would not appear that the property would simply be divided
among the remaining members of the congregation. If, however, the
congregation has been incorporated under a statute that simply provides for a dissolution procedure and for distribution of the property
among the members, more difficult questions may arise. While the
statutory procedure may be said to be a neutral principle, authorizing
a distribution to members of property that, in its most essential aspects, can be viewed as held in trust for religious purposes would
seem to be an extraordinary result. It can, therefore, be expected
that the statute would be interpreted to mean that upon dissolution
the property would be held in trust subject to the cy pres doctrine or
held for the benefit of the denominational body to which the church
is attached.
392. See United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist
Church, 276 N.E.2d 916 (Ind. App. 1971); Macedono-Bulgarian Orthodox Church "St.
Clement Ohridski" v. Macedonian Patriotic Organization "Fatherland," 27 Mich. App.
713, 184 N.W.2d 233 (1970).
393. See note 49 supra.
394. See text accompanying note 292 supra.
395. See note 290 supra and accompanying text.
396. See note 293 supra.

